JP Choon Pte Ltd v Lal Offshore Marine Pte Ltd

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeAedit Abdullah JC
Judgment Date20 June 2016
Neutral Citation[2016] SGHC 115
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberSuit No 551 of 2015 (Summons No 4416 of 2015)
Year2016
Published date28 June 2016
Hearing Date09 December 2015,21 January 2016,16 December 2015
Plaintiff CounselWang Ying Shuang and Wong Jun Ming (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP)
Defendant CounselLalwani Anil Mangan & Raina Mohan Chugani (Lalwani Law Chambers)
Subject MatterCivil Procedure,Summary judgment
Citation[2016] SGHC 115
Aedit Abdullah JC: Introduction

The plaintiff applied for summary judgment under O 14 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) against the defendant for a claim that arose out of a tenancy agreement. I granted its application in respect of eight of its prayers but granted the defendant unconditional leave to defend the remaining prayer. Being dissatisfied with the orders against him, the defendant has appealed.

Background

The plaintiff, JP Choon Pte Ltd, had been leasing out its premises located at 9A Tech Park Crescent (“the Premises”) to the defendant, Lal Offshore Marine Pte Ltd, a company carrying on the business of the building and repair of ships, tankers and other ocean-going vessels, since 11 September 2009. On 29 August 2013, the parties renewed the lease agreement between them and entered into the tenancy agreement that was central to the present proceedings (“the Tenancy Agreement”). It was agreed under the Tenancy Agreement that the Premises would be leased to the defendant for a term of two years from 15 September 2013 to 14 September 2015.

Problems arose in sometime in December 2013 when the defendant started defaulting on the rent and maintenance expenses that became due under the Tenancy Agreement. From August 2014 to May 2015, the plaintiff sent several reminders for payment to the defendant, to which the defendant responded by asking for more time. The plaintiff granted the defendant extensions on a few occasions (although it declined to do so on other occasions), but the latter was still unable to meet the payments. As of April 2015, the defendant owed the plaintiff a total sum of $479,943.75.

On 19 May 2015, the plaintiff’s business development manager, Mr Aw Jia Ming Eugene (“Mr Aw”), met with the defendant’s operations manager, Mr Vinod s/o Vijelal (“Mr Vinod”) at the plaintiff’s office. The parties provided different accounts of what transpired at that meeting (“the 19 May Meeting”).

The defendant’s account was that the parties reached a compromise agreement (“the alleged Compromise Agreement”) at that meeting, comprising the following terms: the defendant would be allowed to pay the outstanding amount of $479,943.75 through (i) monthly instalment payments of $50,000 from June 2015 to February 2016; (ii) a payment of $14,971.90 in March 2016; and (iii) a payment of $14,971.85 in April 2016; the defendant would surrender the remaining lease under the Tenancy Agreement to the plaintiff; and the plaintiff would utilise the security deposit of $132,000 that had been given by the defendant for the purposes of the reinstatement of the Premises or any repair or damage to the Premises.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, took the position that no agreement was reached at that meeting. Its account was that Mr Vinod had proposed the above terms at the meeting but the parties did not reach an agreement in respect of them. Mr Aw stated that he had explicitly told Mr Vinod (i) that he could not commit to any agreement in respect of the instalment payments without first consulting and seeking the approval of the plaintiff’s management; (ii) that the defendant should formally write to the plaintiff if it intended to terminate the Tenancy Agreement; and (iii) that the security deposit could not be used to offset the outstanding monies as it had to be forfeited under the Tenancy Agreement.

Both parties relied on particular pieces of correspondence that they subsequently exchanged to support their respective accounts. The first piece of correspondence was an email sent by Ms Helen Foo from the plaintiff to the defendant on the same day of the meeting to follow up. The plaintiff asserted that this was in line with its practice of documenting its correspondence with the defendant. The email was worded as follows:

During [the 19 May Meeting], Mr Vinod indicated [the defendant’s] intention for early termination of the [Tenancy Agreement] that will only expire on 30th September 2015 and further promised that [the defendant] shall settle all outstanding amount (rent in arrears, services charges and accrued interest) due to [the plaintiff] by instalment payment.

Kindly provide us with a formal letter indicating [the defendant’s] intention as mentioned above together with the payment schedule for the suggested instalment payment for our consideration.

Please also indicate when [the defendant] intends to hand-over the [Premises].

The following day (ie, 20 May 2015), the defendant sent a letter informing the plaintiff that it was no longer occupying the Premises and would be formally handing over the Premises at noon. The plaintiff regarded this as a repudiation of the Tenancy Agreement.

On 21 May 2015, the defendant sent another letter to the plaintiff, in which it made reference to the agreement that the parties had supposedly reached at the 19 May Meeting that it could pay the outstanding sums in instalments as set out at [5(a)] above. Mr Vinod stated that he did not have sight of the email sent by Ms Foo (at [7] above) before he sent these letters as the email had been addressed to the defendant’s main office email account as opposed to his personal account.

On 22 May 2015 (although the letter was dated 21 May 2015), the plaintiff conveyed though a letter that it accepted the defendant’s repudiation of the Tenancy Agreement and demanded that the defendant pay the arrears, including interest, in full by 28 May 2015 or it would commence legal proceedings. Three days later, on 25 May 2015, the plaintiff sent another letter to the defendant, emphasising that the parties had not reached any agreement at the 19 May Meeting before reiterating its demand for the arrears to be paid before 28 May 2015. The relevant part of the letter read:

We have not agreed to, and are not agreeable to[,] your proposal of settling the outstanding payments by way of monthly instalments.

On 28 May 2015, Mr Vinod handed over a cashier’s order for a sum of $50,000 to Mr Aw at the plaintiff’s office. The defendant argued that this evidenced the existence of the alleged Compromise Agreement, while the plaintiff asserted that it accepted the cashier’s order merely as part-payment of the arrears and stated that its Mr Aw had explicitly told Mr Vinod that the rest of the arrears had to be settled that same day.

A week later, on 5 June 2015, the plaintiff commenced the present suit against the defendant, claiming the following: the rent and maintenance expenses that were allegedly owed by the defendant under the Tenancy Agreement, which amounted to $455,869.25 (“Prayer 1”); interest on the sum of $444,340, which was the amount of rent that was allegedly owed by the defendant under the Tenancy Agreement, at a rate of 5.35% per annum, which was the average prime lending rate published by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) at the material time (or at any other rate that the court deemed just) from the date the sum became due and payable to the date of payment (or for any other period that the court deemed just) (“Prayer 2”); interest on the sum of $11,529.25, which was the amount of maintenance expenses that was allegedly owed by the defendant under the Tenancy Agreement, at the rate of 2% per annum as set out in the invoices issued for the payment of the maintenance expenses (“the Invoices for Maintenance Expenses”) (or at any other rate that the court deemed just) from the date the sum became due and payable to the date of payment (or for any other period that the court deemed just) (“Prayer 3”); interest on the sum of $826,820, which was the total monthly rent that the defendant was late in making payment, at the rate of 5.35% per annum for the period that the sum was outstanding (ie, $9,423.53) (“Prayer 4”); interest on the sum of $2,626.85, which was the total maintenance expenses that the defendant was late in making payment, at the rate of 2% per annum for the period that the sum was outstanding (ie, $11.26) (“Prayer 5”); loss and/or damages arising from the early and/or premature termination of the Tenancy Agreement as a result of the defendant’s breaches and/or repudiation of the Tenancy Agreement, which would amount to $285,625.80 (“Prayer 6”); the estimated total costs and/or expenses incurred or to be incurred by the plaintiff in respect of reinstatement and/or repair works (“the Reinstatement Works”) to be carried out at the Premises in order to reinstate the Premises and/or repair any damage to the Premises (“Prayer 7”); liquidated damages in the sum of $282,480, which was the total rent that the plaintiff would have received for the estimated duration that the Reinstatement Works would have to be carried out (“Prayer 8”); a declaration that pursuant to cl 2.29 of the Tenancy Agreement, the defendant was liable for and/or under a duty to indemnify or contribute to the plaintiff for any further or additional costs and/or expenses that may be incurred in respect of any reinstatement and/or repair works to be carried out at the Premises and/or for any additional damages or losses that may be consequently incurred (“Prayer 9”); and a declaration that the security deposit in the sum of $132,000 under the Tenancy Agreement was forfeited to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was not liable and/or under any duty to repay and/or return and/or refund the same to the defendant (“Prayer 10”).

The plaintiff applied for summary judgment under O 14 of the Rules of Court on 9 September 2015. Although the plaintiff had applied for summary judgment to be given in relation to all the prayers listed above, it indicated at the hearing on 9 December 2015 that it no longer wanted to pursue this application in respect of Prayer 9 (set out at [12(i)] above). The plaintiff also asked that Prayer 7 (set out at [12(g)] above) be amended to reflect that the actual costs of the Reinstatement Works were $277,114.25.

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4 cases
  • The “Yue You 902”
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 24 April 2019
    ...(refd) He-Ro Chemicals Ltd v Jeuro Container Transport (HK) Ltd [1993] 2 HKC 368 (folld) JP Choon Pte Ltd v Lal Offshore Marine Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 115 (refd) Lee Hsien Loong v Singapore Democratic Party [2007] 1 SLR(R) 675; [2007] 1 SLR 675 (refd) Kai Min Fashion (HK) Ltd v Fond Express Lo......
  • The "Yue You 902" and another matter
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 24 April 2019
    ...to be tried (see Wee Cheng Swee Henry v Jo Baby Kartika Polim [2015] 4 SLR 250 at [36], JP Choon Pte Ltd v Lal Offshore Marine Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 115 at [14] and Sim Kim Seng (trading as Kim Seng Ship Building) v New West Coast Shipyard Pte Ltd [2016] SGHCR 2 at [10]). In this regard, the ......
  • Loy Wei Ezekiel v Yip Holdings Pte Ltd and another matter
    • Singapore
    • High Court Appellate Division (Singapore)
    • 6 December 2022
    ...assess, having regard to the evidence as a whole, if the defence is credible” (JP Choon Pte Ltd v Lal Offshore Marine Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 115 at [15]). These amplifications of the test are particularly significant in the court’s consideration of the question whether Mr Loy had demonstrated ......
  • Public Prosecutor v Vignish Vijelal
    • Singapore
    • District Court (Singapore)
    • 26 October 2023
    ...Pages 8-9. Incidentally the background facts can be gleaned from the case report for JP Choon Pte Limited v Lal Offshore Marine Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 115. The claim involved outstanding warehousing charges by the plaintiff company against Lal 94 Exhibit D4. 95 Please see P140/140A, Page 11. 9......
1 books & journal articles
  • Civil Procedure
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2016, December 2016
    • 1 December 2016
    ...5 SLR 887. 83 [2016] 2 SLR 442. 84 HT SRL v Wee Shuo Woon [2016] 2 SLR 442 at [40]. 85 JP Choon Pte Ltd v Lal Offshore Marine Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 115; Sim Kim Seng v New West Coast Shipyard Pte Ltd [2016] SGHCR 2; Shi Wen Yue v Shi Minjiu [2016] 4 SLR 911. 86 [2016] SGHCR 2. 87 [1988] 1 SLR......

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