Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v Lee Kuan Yew

JudgeChao Hick Tin JA
Judgment Date22 August 2001
Neutral Citation[2001] SGHC 233
Citation[2001] SGHC 233
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Plaintiff CounselAppellant in person
Defendant CounselDavinder Singh, SC and Hri Kumar (Drew & Napier LLC)
Published date08 April 2013

ended on 22 August 1997 and judgment was reserved. As a result, the hearing of all the other seven actions was adjourned. At or about that time, all the plaintiffs in the seven actions, including the respondent, indicated to Rajendran J that they agreed to be bound by the court’s determination in Suit No. 225 of 1997 as to the meaning of the words complained of. The appellant, however, did not indicate whether he agreed to be similarly bound. The judgment in Suit No. 225 of 1997 was delivered by Rajendran J on 29 September 1997. Both Mr Goh and the appellant appealed against the decision to the Court of Appeal. Their appeals were heard on 27 April 1998 and judgment was reserved. On 17 July 1998, the Court handed down its judgment, allowing Mr Goh’s appeal and dismissing the appellant’s cross-appeal. The Court, among other things, varied the meaning of the defamatory words as determined by Rajendran J. After the judgment of the Court of Appeal, there was a lapse of about 2 years and 4 months during which time there were no further steps or proceedings taken by the plaintiffs in the remaining seven actions (including Suit No. 224 of 1997 initiated by the respondent). Only on 7 December 2000 did the respondent’s solicitors write to the appellant’s solicitors asking if the appellant would agree that the meaning of the words found by the Court of Appeal would apply in Suit No. 224 of 1997. The solicitors for the other plaintiffs sent similar letters to the appellant’s solicitors. However, there was no reply from the appellant or his solicitors to these letters. Consequently, on 14 December 2000, the respondent filed an application in summons-in-chambers No. 604665 of 2000 under O 14, r 12 of the Rules of Court for an order that the meaning of the defamatory words in Suit No. 224 of 1997 would be that as found by the Court of Appeal. The other plaintiffs also filed similar actions. On 22 December 2000, the appellant filed an application in summon-in-chambers No. 604770 of 2000 for an order to strike out the respondent’s action in Suit No. 224 of 1997 for want of prosecution. All these applications were heard before the senior assistant registrar on 19 January 2001. He dismissed the appellant’s application to strike out the present action. He allowed the respondent’s application and the other plaintiffs’ applications for determination on the meaning of the words complained of. The appellant appealed against the senior assistant registrar’s dismissal of his application to strike out the respondent’s action. On 13 February 2001, the appellant’s appeal was heard before Lai Siu Chiu J, who dismissed it. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Held,

dismissing the appeal

(1) The respondent’s first argument that there was a non-compliance by the respondent with O 3, r 5 of the Rules of Court (which was repealed on 15 December 1999) was rejected. Sections 16(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act invoked by the appellant had no application as amendments to procedural rules affects the rights of parties retrospectively. In any case there was ‘contrary intention’ expressed in the Rules of Court against preserving any rights under the repealed O 3 r 5 (see 8 - 13).

(2) Section 18 of the Interpretation Act also relied upon by the appellant relates to the ‘expiration of any written law’. What transpired with reference to O 3, r 5 was not a case of an ‘expiration of any written law’. The written law, O 3, r 5, was repealed on 15 December 1999 and there were enacted, inter alia, O 21, rr 2(6) and 2(7) (see 14).

(3) The purpose of O 3, r 5 is to ensure that a party to an action is not caught off-guard by any step or proceeding taken by the other party after a long lapse of more than a year. Even if the appellant’s right to have such a rule complied with had been preserved and there was a non-compliance with such a rule by the respondent, the proper order the appellant should seek is a dismissal of that application and not an order to strike out the entire action for lack of a notice (see 15).

(4) The appellant’s second argument that it was unnecessary for the respondent to make the application under O 14, r 12 for an order as to the meaning of the defamatory words was also rejected. The respondent had agreed to be bound by the meaning of the words complained of as determined by the court, but the appellant did not at any time so agree. In the circumstances, the respondent’s application to court for determination as to the meaning of the words was necessary and was a genuine step or proceeding in the action (see 16 - 17).

(5) Soon after the decision of the Court of Appeal, the respondent should have applied for a fresh date for the trial of the present action, but he did not. Such default or inaction, however, was not contumelious conduct. Absence of explanation per se does not give rise to an inference of intentional and contumelious conduct. Contumelious conduct involves an element of scorn and intentional disregard of the rules of court or court order. There is no evidence that the respondent has in anyway so acted (see 33).

(6) On the facts, there was a delay of well over two years in which no action was taken by the respondent, and no reason or explanation was provided as to why no application was made to court for a fresh date for the trial of the present action. There had been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of the respondent (see 38 - 39).

(7) The unavailability of the services of counsel does not amount to a prejudice. The appellant can always engage another counsel to represent him, and in any event, the appellant has not shown that, since the death of Mr Carman and the elevation to the Bench of Mr Gray, he had not been able to engage a comparable counsel from London or elsewhere to represent him (see 41).

(8) All that transpired was a lengthy period of two years and four months in which the respondent failed to apply for a fresh date for the trial of the present action. The was no breach of or non-compliance with any order of the court or rules of court or disregard of any court procedure. In this case, the fact that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable did not amount to an abuse of court process (see 42).

(9) The words complained of were spoken by the appellant on 1 January 1997 and the period of limitation will expire only on 31 December 2002. Hence, if this action is struck out, the respondent is at liberty to bring fresh proceedings based on the same cause of action. Thus, such striking out is of no benefit to the appellant; it would only result in further costs and expenses being incurred (see 45).

Cases referred to

Goh Chok Tong v Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin

[1998] 1 SLR 547 (refd)
Goh Chok Tong v Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1998] 3 SLR 337 (refd)
Turnbull v Forman (1885) 15 QBD 234 (folld)
R v Chandra Dharma [1905] 2 KB 335 (folld)
Birkett v James [1977] 2 All ER 801, [1978] AC 297 (folld)
Allen v Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 543, [1968] 2 QB 229 (folld)
Wee Siew Noi v Lee Mun Tuck (the administrator of the estate of Lee Wai Leng, deceased) [1993] 2 SLR 232 (folld)
Grovit and Ors v Doctor and Ors [1997] 2 All ER 417; [1997] 1 WLR 640 (refd)
The Tokai Maru [1998] 3 SLR 105 (refd)
Arbuthnot Latham Bank Ltd and Ors v Tralfalgar Holdings Ltd and Ors [1998] 2 All ER 181; [1998] 1 WLR 1426 (refd)
Culbert v Stephen G Westwell & Company Ltd and Anor [1993] PIQR P 54 (refd)
QCD (M) Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) v Wah Nam Plastic Industry Pte Ltd [1999] 2 SLR 381 (refd)
Syed Mohamed Abdul Muthaliff and Anor v Arjan Bhisham Chotrani [1999] 1 SLR 750 (refd)
Yeo Hock Chuan v Wong Chong Weng [1997] 2 SLR 752 (folld)
Barclays Bank plc v Maling and Anor (unreported, 23 April 1997) (refd)
Miles v McGregor (unreported, 23 January 1998) (refd)
Choraria v Sethia (1998) 142 SJLB 53 (refd)

Legislation referred to

Rules of Court O 3, r 5 (repealed on 15 December 1999), O 21, rr 2(6) and 2(7)
Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 1999 Ed) ss 16(1)(c), 18

Appeal from:

Registrar’s Appeal No. 600021/01 in Suit No. 224/97

JUDGMENT:

Grounds of Decision

Introduction

1.This appeal arose from an application by Mr Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam, the appellant (‘the appellant’), to strike out the action in Suit No. 224 of 1997 initiated by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, the respondent (‘the respondent’) The application was heard before the senior assistant registrar and was dismissed. The appellant appealed to a judge in chambers, and the appeal was heard before Lai Siu Chiu J The learned judge dismissed it and against her decision the appellant now brings this appeal

The facts

2.The material facts giving rise to this appeal are briefly these. On 30 January 1997, the respondent sued the appellant in Suit No. 224 of 1997 for defamation over a statement made by the appellant at a Workers’ Party rally held on 1 January 1997. Ten other plaintiffs including the Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong, also sued the appellant for defamation over the same statement but in seven separate actions All these actions were, on or about 9 June 1997, set down for trial, and the trial dates were subsequently fixed for 18 August to 22 August 1997. On 18 July 1997, Christopher Lau JC ordered that the action commenced by Mr Goh in Suit No. 225 of 1997 be tried first, and that was to be followed by the other actions with Suit No. 224 of 1997 (instituted by the respondent) to be tried last. 3.All the eight actions came on for hearing before Rajendran J on 18 August 1997. In accordance with the order of Christopher Lau JC made on 18 July 1997, Suit No. 225 of 1997 instituted by Mr Goh was heard first. The hearing ended on 22 August 1997, and judgment was reserved, and as a result the hearing of all the other seven actions was adjourned. At or about that point in time, all the plaintiffs in the seven actions, including the respondent, indicated to Rajendran J that they agreed to be bound by the court’s determination in Suit No. 225 of 1997...

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