Japan-India cooperation and Abe's democratic security diamond: possibilities, limitations and the view from Southeast Asia.

• Author: Lee, Lavina

In December 2012, just one day after assuming the premiership for the second time, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe published an opinion piece on the virtues of a "Democratic Security Diamond" (DSD). In the article, Abe called for the formation of a "security diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific" with four of Asia's most prominent maritime democracies--Australia, India, the United States and Japan--forming the points of the diamond. The Japanese leader explicitly called on these states to join forces to oppose Chinese "coercion" and to defend peace, stability and freedom of navigation within the diamond. The DSD idea represents the second time that Abe has attempted to form a security grouping among these four liberal democracies, the first being the failed 2007 Quadrilateral Initiative involving the same four countries. (1)

The rehashed quadrilateral concept raises a number of interesting issues relevant to the future security environment of the Indo-Pacific, and for Southeast Asia in particular. With respect to the current security environment, regional architecture has been based on a network of United States-centric bilateral alliances and partnerships with countries such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. The burgeoning Japan-India relationship is a more recent bilateral development.

Such bilateral relationships sit side-by-side with broader multilateral regimes such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). These and other multilateral regimes are important diplomatic forums, but they do not impose any security obligations on member states. In short, security relationships in Asia have been built on a number of bilateral networks. The DSD idea is significant because it potentially proposes a change or evolution of the existing security architecture based on bilateral relationships that has served Southeast Asian states well for many decades.

With respect to Southeast Asia, all member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seek to ensure that the organization remains in the "driver's seat"--or maintains "Centrality"--when it comes to leading regional forums. Up to now, the security bilateral relationships in the region have not overtly challenged ASEAN's diplomatic standing or relevance. In contrast, and for some Southeast Asian states, a possible quadrilateral grouping such as the DSD--being built on the back of closer India--Japan ties--might be seen as a possible threat to ASEAN Centrality. Assessing individual and collective responses of Southeast Asian states to India-Japan developments and the DSD concept is an important part of the discussion.

In addressing the above issues, this article has several aims. The first is to outline Abe's idea of the DSD, why Japan has recently advocated for its formation, and why the United States, India and Australia are targeted as potential members. The second is to discuss Japan's greater willingness and capacity to play a meaningful strategic role, applied to a DSD context. The third is to discuss deepening Japan-India strategic cooperation and assess the prospect of Indian support for the quadrilateral idea. The article assess what role India might play (taking account of India's force capabilities, existing regional relationships, maritime strategy and interests and its relationship with China), and its level of interest in joining such a grouping. Finally, the article suggests how key players in Southeast Asia might view closer security ties between Japan and India, and the prospect of a DSD being built on the foundation of this emerging bilateral relationship.

The Democratic Security Diamond

Prime Minister Abe's argument for the establishment of a DSD rests on a number of basic premises. The first is that the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the seas in between them, represent a new centre of prosperity in the world, largely as a result of export oriented development and open markets for trade, made possible because of peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the region's oceans. Elsewhere, Japanese diplomacy has promoted the idea that the region could form part of an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" based on the spread of liberal economic systems i.e. an open network that would allow "people, goods, capital and knowledge to flow freely". (2)

The second is that these interests and values are shared across the Indo-Pacific region. In this regard, in a speech to the Indian Parliament in August 2007, Abe spoke of the "Confluence of the Two Seas", alluding not only to the physical and geostrategic convergence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, but also shared values and interests among littoral states and trading nations that use these oceans. (3)

The third premise of the DSD is that these interests and values are under clear threat from China, which Abe characterizes as using coercion to assert territorial and maritime claims in both the East and South China Seas. Using the most forthright language of any world leader so far, Abe has accused China of seeking to control the South China Sea--to create a "Lake Beijing"--for the strategic purpose of basing aircraft carriers and "their nuclear-powered attack submarines, capable of launching missiles with nuclear warheads" to intimidate the region. (4) He further points out that China is undertaking "daily exercises in coercion around the Senkaku Islands" by using law enforcement vessels to challenge Japanese control and jurisdiction over the Islands and normalize China's presence in these waters. (5)

Indeed, it is his explicit linkage of the East and South China Sea disputes that may well give rise to the most compelling argument for Australia, India and the United States to form a DSD (and stir Southeast Asian interest). As Abe explained in his opinion piece, it is only through solidarity that Chinese naval and territorial expansion can be halted, and that freedom of navigation defended:

If Japan were to yield [in its dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands], the South China Sea would become even more fortified. Freedom of navigation, vital for trading countries such as Japan and South Korea, would be seriously hindered. The naval assets of the United States, in addition to those of Japan, would find it difficult to enter the entire area, though the majority of the two China seas is international water. (6) It is this linking of the East and South China Sea disputes that China would view most seriously as having the greatest scope to unite opposition to its maritime claims and behaviour. While Australia and India have no direct maritime disputes with China in either of these theatres, each have direct interests in ensuring that these maritime disputes are resolved peacefully, and that maritime claims do not threaten open and unimpeded access by commercial ships to arguably the most important sea-lines-of-communication (SLOCs) in the world.

Abe might have also noted that there are few countries in Asia with formidable naval power projection capabilities. The American, Indian and Australian navies would be part of this exclusive club (along with China). There is little point pushing cooperation between powers that bring little strategic and military weight to the table. It is also likely that Tokyo views meaningful cooperation between the Australian, Indian, Japanese and US navies as a force multiplier for all four fleets, and as such would considerably complicate China's ability to achieve its strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific.

As far as the DSD is concerned, timing may be more fortuitous than when the 2007 Quadrilateral Initiative was proposed. The earlier quad was conceived prior to the period when China became more assertive in pursuing its maritime claims. Since then, Japan itself has faced direct and increasingly frequent challenges from China over its control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, and the airspace above them. (7)

With respect to the South China Sea, China has added more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratly Islands. (8) This is more than all other claimants combined, and more than in the entire history of the region. (9) Between 2012 and June 2015, seven artificial islands were created from submerged reefs in the Spratlys, and now include expanded port facilities, military buildings and airstrips capable of hosting fighter jets and large transport aircraft. (10) In February 2016, a new phase of militarization was reached when it was reported that China had deployed antiaircraft missile launchers to Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, which is also claimed by Vietnam. (11) Many analysts have predicted that China will eventually declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea, which will be enforced using the airstrips built in the Spratlys. (12)

Moreover, the desire to entrench quadrilateral cooperation is likely triggered by increasing frustration with a lack of concerted and effective action to oppose Chinese activities, including by the United States. China has not been deterred in the assertion of its territorial and jurisdictional claims despite diplomatic censure by the United States, and other claimant states in the region. Abe has pushed to ensure that Washington is explicit in considering the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands a part of Japan, and that challenges to its jurisdiction over the islands is covered by the US-Japan Mutual Defence Treaty. This was reaffirmed by President Barack Obama during his visit to Tokyo in April 2014. (13)

Until recently, it is arguable that the United States has not taken any bold steps in this regard, merely calling for the peaceful resolution of territorial claims using accepted legal principles under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a halt to land reclamation and militarization of disputed...