Jane Rebecca Ong v Lim Lie Hoa also known as Lim Le Hoa also known as Lily Arief Husni and Another

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chao Hick Tin J
• Judgment Date: 16 July 1996
• Neutral Citation: [1996] SGHC 140
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Published date: 25 January 2013
• Year: 1996
• Plaintiff Counsel: Jane Ong (In Person) (Lee & Lee) as the plaintiff
• Defendant Counsel: Tan Kok Quan (with Ramseh Pillay),Harry Elias (with Phillip Fong) (Harry Elias & Partners)
• Citation: [1996] SGHC 140

Judgment:

Curia Advisari Vult

JUDGMENT

This action, which was first commenced by way of an originating summons, has been converted to a writ pursuant to an order of court of 4 April 1994. By this action the plaintiff claims broadly the following reliefs:-

(i) that a certain deed of release executed on 29 June 1989 by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant be declared void or unenforceable;

(ii) that the first defendant make certain payments - 519,000 and US$75,000 - to the plaintiff

(iii) that various enquiries and accounts be taken to determine the assets of the estate of one Ong Seng King also spelt as Ong Keng Seng also known as Ong King Seng also known as Arief Husni (hereinafter called the deceased) and the whereabouts of those assets and to determine the amounts due to the plaintiff by virtue of a deed of assignment wherein the second defendant assigned to the plaintiff a half-share of his entitlement to the estate of the deceased.

The plaintiff is the estranged wife of the second defendant. The parties were married in England on 1 October 1982. Three children were born out of the union, the first in August 1982, the second in November 1983 and the third in March 1985. In 1988, divorce proceedings were commenced in London by the plaintiff against the second defendant. A decree nisi was obtained. It has yet to be made absolute.

The first defendant is the mother of the second defendant. At all material times the first and second defendants were and are the administratrix and co-administrators/trustees of the estate of the deceased, who died on 22 October 1974 in Indonesia, and who was the husband and father of the first and second defendants respectively. Initially, the first defendant and her sister, one Lim Lie Fong, were appointed co-administratrice of the estate of the deceased as the second defendant was still a minor. The net value of the estate in Singapore (as on the date of death) was declared by them to be $5,117,269. In 1978 the second defendant became an administrator in place of Lim Lie Fong.

It would appear that at the time of the death of the deceased, he possessed besides in Singapore, considerable assets in Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and possibly Taiwan. The deceased was a wealthy banker (in Indonesia) and businessman.

Three main questions arise for consideration in this action. First, whether the deed of assignment and power of attorney executed on 29 August 1991 by the second defendant in favour of the plaintiff are valid and enforceable. Second, whether the deed of release executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant is valid and enforceable. A third issue, raised by the defendants, is whether the present be struck out on account of champerty and/or maintenance, as being contrary to public policy.

The plaintiff acted in person throughout the trial. She was represented during the earlier part of the proceedings.

Background

I think it is necessary for me to set out the background giving rise to the present action. I should at this juncture say that the first defendant chose not to offer herself for cross- examination on her affidavits. Thus, I would disregard her affidavits unless any statements therein are in favour of the plaintiff. The second defendant gave evidence. There are disputes on fact as between the plaintiff and the second defendant. The facts, as I have found them, are as follows unless otherwise indicated.

The second defendant, an Indonesian, was born in 1957 in Indonesia. Since the sixties, the deceased and the two defendants became permanent residents of Singapore. In 1973 the second defendant was sent to school in the UK. He returned to Singapore in 1976, stayed for two years and then went back to England again in 1978 where he undertook various courses. His younger brother, Ping, was then also studying in England.

In late 1979/early 1980 the plaintiff met the second defendant, who was then residing in a flat in Mayfair, London (the Audley Court flat). In 1981 the plaintiff moved in to live with the second defendant. The first defendant did not approve of their relationship. She threatened to disinherit the second defendant unless he ended his relationship with the plaintiff. She forbade them from staying at the Audley Court flat. Her attitude towards the plaintiff softened a little in 1982 when she came to know that the plaintiff was carrying the second defendant's child.

At all relevant times the plaintiff was supported financially by the second defendant. From 1980/1981 the second defendant was involved in various projects with funds provided by the first defendant. He was also receiving funds from her for his own upkeep. It is not clear whether the various moneys which the second defendant received from the first defendant were money from his entitlement from his father's estate or gifts/loans from his mother (first defendant). The plaintiff alleged that the second defendant's involvement in the projects was at the behest of the first defendant. The plaintiff also said that because funds from his mother did not come regularly, his debts to banks mounted. All these are matters which will have to be investigated, if I should order an inquiry.

One of the projects the second defendant was then involved in was the Southgate Development project. In December 1981 the second defendant sold the Southgate project. The plaintiff said this was because of the instructions of the first defendant. After paying all outstanding loans and debts, the second defendant was left with only about 60,000 - 70,000 and several luxury cars. The cars were left over on the winding-up of a car leasing business which the second defendant was also then involved in.

At about the end of 1981 the plaintiff and the second defendant purchased a four-bedroom house at Barnet, London at a price of 136,000. A mortgage loan of 75,000 was obtained. The net proceeds from the sale of the Southgate project was used to pay the difference.

Each venture that the second defendant was involved in failed, incurring large debts as a result. Because of the debt situation the second defendant became depressed, so much so that in early 1983, the mortgagee of the Barnet property repossessed it. Eventually the Barnet property was sold in January 1984 leaving net proceeds of only 44,000 after repaying the outstanding loan. The 44,000 was used to settle their other debts. In the meantime, before the sale was effected, they moved back to stay at the Audley Court flat.

As far as the plaintiff was concerned she would have preferred that the second defendant sold the Audley Court flat (which was jointly owned by the second defendant and his brother Ping), an accommodation the plaintiff felt they could not afford to maintain, instead of the Barnet house. The plaintiff said the first defendant refused.

Sometime in 1984 the plaintiff started a business, Alexander Real Estate, dealing in leasing of properties located at Mayfair, London. Things seemed to be moving in the right direction. Then the second defendant, together with the first defendant, thought they should turn it into something big. This venture also came to nothing after spending 60,000, paid by the first defendant, on a feasibility study. However, the second defendant alleged that the idea of expanding the business of Alexander Real Estate to include the business of a country club was that of the plaintiff. The second defendant claimed that the first defendant had nothing to do with this venture.

All these stresses arising out of failed business ventures did not help to maintain the relationship between the plaintiff and the second defendant. However, with the first defendant's consent, in or about 1985 they looked around for a house. They viewed various properties, including one at 39 Sheldon Avenue. The plaintiff and the second defendant loved that house and decided to buy it. The purchase was completed very quickly in December 1985 but in the name of the first defendant. The plaintiff said the intention was that the property was to be the matrimonial home of her and the second defendant. The plaintiff stated that at the office of the vendor's solicitor -

The first defendant, using broken English with the second defendant translating where her English was inadequate, explained that the property was being purchased as a house for the second defendant and I....

Mr Hyde (the solicitor) explained he had not sufficient time to structure a purchase of the property and was unsure about tax implications. He suggested that the first defendant, who was not a UK resident, should hold the title deeds in her name until the tax implications could be clarified. A further reason discussed at the time was to protect against any potential substantial creditors of the second defendant. We accepted the solicitor's advice and the property transaction was completed in the first defendant's name.

The second defendant said that the Sheldon property was purchased by the first defendant with her own funds with the intention that it would be for the benefit of Ping, Elton (another younger brother of the second defendant) the second defendant and his three children. A draft trust deed was drawn, which was never executed, wherein it was stated that the property was to be held in trust as aforesaid. At the time of the transaction the first defendant remitted 200,000 into the joint account of the plaintiff and the second defendant to pay for their debts and living expenses, including paying for the stamp duties and legal costs relating to the purchase of the Sheldon property. For the purposes of this action, I do not think it is necessary for me to make a ruling on the question for whose benefit the first defendant is holding the Sheldon property.

In 1986, the second defendant became involved in a pharmaceutical project in China. The plaintiff alleged that it was the first defendant who brought the...