Introduction: Domestic Determinants of Southeast Asia's Relations with the United States and China.

• Date: 01 April 2024
• Author: Huang, Chin-Hao,Ho, Selina,Huang, Chin-Hao^Ho, Selina

Southeast Asia is at a crossroads between two superpowers--the United States and China--and their intensifying strategic competition. According to the conventional narrative, Southeast Asian states possess a relatively limited and constrained set of options available to respond, especially as China's military and economic influence surges in the region. (1) This Special Issue questions that assumption. Each of the six country case studies reveals that the region's foreign policy statecraft is far broader and more complex than is often assumed.

Southeast Asian states take a long-term perspective. (2) Instead of fearing or resisting China's economic and geopolitical rise since the 2000s, they have mostly seen it as strategically beneficial for themselves. Indeed, it has not only helped them financially but also compelled China to bilaterally and multilaterally engage in the region, including through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), thus incentivizing Beijing to adopt peaceful, norms-based behaviour and re-evaluate its own approach to potential regional conflicts. Moreover, an active China allows Southeast Asian states to pursue economic and geopolitical diversification, preventing them from becoming overly reliant on the United States. At the same time, it provides a strategic rationale for Southeast Asian states wanting the United States to maintain a commitment to the region, assuaging their concerns about Washington potentially abandoning them.

Thus, Southeast Asian states have not simply chosen sides, even if the uncertainties--from China's growing economic and military capabilities to suspicions about Washington's long-term commitment to the region--are of considerable significance to regional stability. (3) Rather than choosing the United States over China (or vice-versa), they have pursued policies that minimize their sense of vulnerability. (4) This is often referred to as "hedging". According to Evelyn Goh, it is "a set of strategies aimed at avoiding--or planning for contingencies in--a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning or neutrality. Instead, they cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another." (5) Small states can broaden, expand and diversify their economic and strategic dependencies by seeking pragmatic ties across security and economic domains with as many powers as possible. (6) Doing so gives the external powers a stake in a stable regional order. Moreover, in pursuit of greater inclusivity, Southeast Asian states try to minimize the chances of suboptimal outcomes, such as an increasingly coercive China, a disengaged United States and an unstable regional order. (7)

However, the domestic factors influencing Southeast Asia's foreign policy outcomes are vastly underemphasized in the existing literature. Observers tend to assess the changing balance of power in the region solely through the lens of US-China rivalry and great power prerogatives. But this overlooks many important factors that influence a Southeast Asian government's foreign policy. For instance, how do historical legacies and cultural differences with either superpower affect Southeast Asian decision-making? What role do regime legitimacy and political fragmentation play in domestic politics? By examining how foreign policy is, to some extent, shaped at the domestic and national level, the rationale for Southeast Asia in adopting strategic diversification externally becomes much clearer and more nuanced. More importantly, uncovering how domestic factors vary across time and space further enables us to map the changes and continuities in Southeast Asian states' policies towards great powers. Interestingly, while Southeast Asian states' policies may evolve over time, the rationale behind these decisions has been remarkably consistent, driven by the imperatives of political survival and regime legitimacy.

Unfortunately, such a crucial role that small states play has often been relegated to immateriality in the field of International Relations. For instance, according to Kenneth Waltz, "It would be as ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica as it would be to construct an economic theory... based on the minor firms. The fates of all states are affected much more by the acts and the interactions of the major ones than of the minor ones." (8) But it is not always the case, as the adage claims, that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must". After all, a major power's authority cannot be realized through force alone. Coercion as a means of demonstrating strength might be convenient and expedient, but it is also costly to maintain over time and often undercuts a state's ability to wield actual influence. (9) A more enduring form of leadership and influence derives from the validation and acceptance by others, a critical aspect of relational power which is much more difficult to attain than material strength. Indeed, when smaller states confer upon a larger state the recognition of regional or global leadership, it comes with the expectation of providing order and upholding (or at least not violating) the existing norms of regional security. (10) In short, small states possess an influence with which large, powerful states must contend. (11) Southeast Asian states can provide and confer the legitimacy the United States and China desire. According to Alice Ba,

Ultimately, major powers cannot simply decide to lead; others must also
                be persuaded to follow. What this suggests is that leadership is not
                just a material relationship but also a socially negotiated one--one
                that, moreover, requires a minimum of attentiveness to the concerns and
                sensitivities of other states. (12)
                

Large, powerful states also rely on "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions". (13) Given that self-legitimation is an oxymoron, it stands to reason that whether the United States' or China's behaviour is deemed desirable depends largely on affirmation by Southeast Asian governments, which requires an exploration of how domestic politics within the region's states inform that affirmation.

Beyond Balancing

This Special Issue was borne out of a conference held in Singapore in the spring of 2023. With the 2024 US presidential elections in mind, one of the reasons for convening this workshop was the need to better inform US policy elites about why Southeast Asia matters to US foreign policy and how the region views the United States' role in Southeast Asia. As the US-China strategic competition intensifies, it becomes increasingly important to understand how Southeast Asian states think accurately. Indeed, it is often easy to misread them if one only looks through the perspective of Washington or Beijing. To ensure that the thoughts and voices of Southeast Asians are accurately represented, the conference participants cum authors of these articles are senior and emerging Southeast Asian scholars. The guest editors of this Special Issue are also from the region.

The analysis in each country case study in this Special Issue affirms two key observations: Southeast Asian states are not engaging in all-out deterrence or hard military balancing in response to China's rise--the region is not embracing China's rise without any qualms, but it is engaging in strategic diversification while keeping all channels of communication open (14)--and the increasing reliance on military capabilities by the United States and China to assert their authority in the region is not conducive for regional security and stability. In fact, the jostling for regional...