Indonesia as an emerging peacekeeping power: norm revisionist or pragmatic provider?

• Author: Capie, David
• Position: Essay

There is growing interest among analysts in the increasing involvement of emerging powers in peace operations. As a larger share of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers are sourced from non-Western states, some have argued that these countries will increasingly demand more of a say in the deployment of those troops, including operational mandates and financing. (1) This, they claim, will challenge liberal norms around peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, including doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Protection of Civilians (POC), and robust measures such as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) deployed as part of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). One influential analysis has described this as "the new geo-politics of peace operations", arguing that emerging powers "are likely to act as 'norm revisionists' increasingly influencing the make-up, design and conduct of future peace operations on the basis of their own interests and approaches". (2)

This article examines the changing policy and interests of Indonesia against the backdrop of those claims. Indonesia is frequently mentioned as an emerging player in peacekeeping, but its role has been understudied compared to, for example, China, India, South Africa and Brazil. Several recent reports devoted to emerging powers and peace operations identify Indonesia as a relevant actor, but it receives little detailed attention when it comes to the actual analysis. (3) Drawing on interviews with foreign and defence ministry officials, and independent analysts in Jakarta, as well as statements by Indonesian representatives in the UN and other forums, this article seeks to fill the gap.

In discussing Indonesia's growing role in peacekeeping operations (PKOs), the article makes three arguments. First, although Indonesia has a long history of involvement in UN PKOs, there has been a significant change in its policy in the last decade, with much greater importance attached to peacekeeping in particular since 2011. The article offers some explanations for this new emphasis and explores how it might play out in the future, including highlighting potential constraints.

Second, although Indonesia retains a strong preference for traditional "blue helmet" missions mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and based on principles of host country consent, impartiality and limited use of force, these considerations are not static. While Indonesia is cautious about aspects of the "new" peacekeeping agenda, such as POC and peace enforcement missions, it cannot be considered a norm revisionist. Rather, Jakarta's views on peacekeeping reflect its wider concerns about global order. Indonesia wants to be involved in peacekeeping missions that have wide legitimacy, with greater clarity around mandates and resourcing, and with more consultation between the authorizing powers in the UNSC and troop contributing countries. In reality, Indonesia has also proved to be more pragmatic than some of its rhetoric would suggest.

Third, to the extent that Indonesia has challenged norms, it has done so as an advocate for a more ambitious approach to peacekeeping in Southeast Asia. It was the first to argue for an ASEAN peacekeeping force and has supported the use of regional troops to monitor peace agreements. In doing so, it has challenged long-established ASEAN norms around non-interference and encountered resistance from some neighbouring states. (4) In sum, the Indonesian case supports some of the claims made about emerging powers and peace operations but challenges others, underlining the diversity of this group of states.

The article is organized into four sections. The first part provides a brief overview of the literature on emerging powers and peace operations, identifying some of the core claims and situating the Indonesian case. Section two provides an overview of Indonesia's involvement in peacekeeping, including the important changes in policy and practice that have taken place in the last five years. It also offers some explanations for this significant new commitment. The third section examines Indonesian views on some of the liberal norms associated with the new peacekeeping agenda, concluding that while it has reservations, it is far from being a norm revisionist. The final section discusses Indonesia's role within ASEAN, making the case that it has been one of the more innovative and ambitious Asian powers when it has come to challenging long-established regional norms around multilateral military cooperation.

The "New Geopolitics" of Peace Operations

Over the last decade there has been a growing interest in the role of emerging powers in peacekeeping operations. (5) This has been prompted by the striking decline in the proportion of peacekeepers provided to UN missions by Western states: from 73 per cent of all peacekeepers in 1990 to just 6 per cent in 2014. (6) A large literature has emerged exploring how states that were once wary of, or hostile towards, UN peacekeeping have stepped up their contributions. (7) For example, Brazil, China, India and South Africa have tripled their share of the total personnel deployed on UN PKOs from 5 per cent in 2001 to 15 per cent in 2010. (8) The greatest part of this research has focused on the role of China, but there is also a large body of work exploring India's peacekeeping policy, as well as other emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, Turkey and South Africa. (9)

Underlying this interest is the assumption that as the political and economic power of new players grows, and they become more important participants in peace operations, they will demand a greater say in decisions around how, when and where peacekeeping is conducted. Indeed, as the respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has argued "there are already signs that such shifts are affecting peace operations". (10) While no one suggests emerging powers have an identical set of interests or capabilities, analysts note historically they share a common experience of being outside the core group of states who shaped the post-World War II international order. In the words of one report, these are states that have been "on the outside looking in". (11) With growing economic, political and military power, these countries expect to have a greater say in decisions about the norms, rules and practices that shape global politics.

Looking specifically at peace operations, analysts note the different views of the "established powers", primarily in the West, and emerging powers. Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams distinguish between what they call Westphalian and post-Westphalian approaches to peace operations, with emerging powers tending to favour a more Westphalian approach that prioritizes state sovereignty and non-intervention. (12) Benjamin Carvalho and Cedric de Coning go further, saying

in broad terms most countries in the West have over the last decade increased their willingness to intervene in crisis zones, with force if necessary, to protect civilians and to promote democracy, while the rising powers take a more nuanced view, favouring instead the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. (13) According to one leading scholar of peace operations, Thierry Tardy, this narrower understanding of the concept of state sovereignty is "equated by a relatively strict adherence to the three peacekeeping principles (impartiality, non-resort to force and consent of the host state), and a general opposition to the conceptual overstretch that characterizes them". (14) Emerging powers are less enthusiastic about peace enforcement and peace-building, because they perceive them "to have been abused by the West as a tool to impose neoliberal values on weak states, and thus as a way of using the UN and other international and regional organisations to increase its (i.e. the West's) influence in the international system". (15)

These differences have most starkly played out in debates around the 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led military intervention in Libya and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. But out of the limelight, distinct approaches have also been identified in analyses of attitudes towards UN peacekeeping by a range of emerging powers. For example, in their lengthy survey of Chinese contributions to UN PKOs, Bates Gill and Huang Chin-Hao argue that China is seeking to "gradually counterbalance Western influence and more actively shape the norms guiding UN peacekeeping operations in ways that are consistent with Chinese foreign policy principles and national interests". (16)

In these analyses of emerging powers and PKOs, Indonesia frequently attracts attention. For example, a 2012 SIPRI report describes Indonesia--along with Brazil and China--as one of peacekeeping's "new players". With a population of 255 million and an economy that has been predicted to be larger than those of the United Kingdom and Germany by 2030, this is hardly surprising. (17) Yet, compared to the numerous case studies on China, India and Brazil, Indonesia has been comparatively neglected. Bangkit Widodo's 2010 unpublished paper is a very useful discussion of Indonesian peacekeeping in the context of Jakarta's bebas aktif ("free and independent") foreign policy, but his analysis predates the recent increase in government attention to peacekeeping. (18) Prominent Indonesian foreign policy intellectual and former presidential adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar has provided an empirically rich analysis, but it also largely focuses on the period prior to 2012. (19) Alistair Cook compares Indonesia's contributions with those of Malaysia, and Natalie Sambhi examines Jakarta's new peacekeeping ambitions, but their fine works do not address Indonesian responses to changing normative debates about the nature of peace operations. (20) Finally, Leonard Hutabara has explored peacekeeping from...