Hua Sheng Tao v Welltech Construction Pte Ltd and Another and Another Application

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Choo Han Teck J
• Judgment Date: 24 February 2003
• Neutral Citation: [2003] SGHC 28
• Docket Number: Originating Summonses Nos 1744
• Date: 24 February 2003
• Published date: 07 October 2003
• Year: 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Adeline Chong Seow Ming [Harry Elias Partnership]
• Citation: [2003] SGHC 28
• Defendant Counsel: N Srinivasan and G Prasanna Devi [Hoh & Partners]
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Appeals,Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed) s 21(1),Whether leave to appeal required,Plaintiff appealing to High Court,Leave,Civil Procedure

1. There were two applications before me both of which were for leave to appeal to the High Court against the judgment of a District Court judge in a suit brought there by the plaintiff against the first and second defendants. The plaintiff was a semi-skilled worker employed to plaster the walls of a building under construction. The first defendants were the main contractors of the building project and it was they who supplied the scaffolding, including a metal deck, for the workers such as the plaintiff. The second defendants were the sub-contractors and the immediate employers of the plaintiff.

2. While he was climbing down the scaffolding in the course of his work, the plaintiff stepped on a metal deck which the trial judge found as a fact to be inherently defective. The deck gave way and the plaintiff fell from a height of about 1.7m to the ground, injuring his ankles. He sued for damages which his solicitors quantified at $188,872.89. The trial judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the first defendants but allowed the claim against the second defendants. However, he found that the plaintiff had contributed to the accident to the extent of 40%. The judge then assessed damages at $59,872.39. 60% of that sum is $35,923.43. Neither party was pleased with the decision of the court. It was not disputed that by virtue of s 21(1) of the Supreme Court Of Judicature Act, Ch 322 the second defendants required leave to appeal. They maintained however, that the plaintiff also required leave under the same provision to appeal because the amount in dispute was less than the sum of $50,000 stipulated in s 21(1). I am setting out below the text of s 21(1), for convenience:

"Subject to the provisions of this Act or any other written law, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a decision of a District Court or Magistrate's Court in any suit or action for the recovery of immovable property or in any civil cause or matter where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter exceeds $50,000 or such other amount as may be specified by an order made under subsection (3) or with the leave of a District Court, a Magistrate's Court or the High Court if under that amount." (my emphasis)

3. Miss Chong, counsel for the defendants, submitted on the authority of a Malaysian High Court case, Lein Tiam Hock v Arumugam a/l Kandasamy [1999] 6 MLJ 129, that the "amount in dispute or value of the subject matter" in the present case is $35,923.43. The court in Lein Tiam Hock also had to consider a statutory provision containing the same words "amount in dispute or value of the subject matter". In that case, the court was of the view that the emphasis should be on the word "decision" in the Malaysian equivalent of our s 21(1) and, placing his emphasis there, the learned judge concluded that "the amount in dispute or the subject-matter provided for under s 28 [our s 21], must relate to the decision of the subordinate court, and not to any sum claimed either by the plaintiff or the combined sum of the claim and counterclaim submitted by the defendant, if any". Further on, the learned judge analysed the effect of the statutory words in this way: a plaintiff who does not appeal against the award is, in principle, not prejudiced by it. In "real terms", the plaintiff would have abandoned any larger claim that he might originally have made. The defendant, on the other hand, believing that he was wrongly judged, would be the one to file the appeal. The court then said, "In practical terms when an aggrieved party files an appeal he must be disputing the judgment sum awarded against him. Therefore, shorn of all the legal niceties, that judgment sum must be the amount in dispute". With respect, I do not agree that the "amount in dispute" in s 21(1) necessarily means the "judgment sum". It may well be a larger sum, namely, the amount claimed by the plaintiff at first instance. That is because his dissatisfaction with the judge's decision may stem from his belief that the judge ought to have granted him the full amount originally claimed. For my part, I would place emphasis on the "amount in dispute" rather than on the word "decision" in s 21(1). The relevant portion of s 21(1) in present context would read as follows,

"an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a decision of a District Court or Magistrate’s in any civil cause or matter where the amount in dispute exceeds $50,000".

Read in plain English, the meaning seems clear enough. The only question one need ask is whether the plain reading will result in an absurdity. The answer plainly, is no.

4. Mr Srinivasan, counsel for the plaintiff, also drew my attention to Augustine & Anor v Goh Siam Yong [1992] 1 SLR 767 and wondered whether the statutory limit should be pegged to the difference between the amount claimed by the plaintiff and the amount awarded by the judge rather than just the amount as originally claimed by the plaintiff. He expressed the fear that if it was to be the latter, then s 21(1) would be rendered impotent and of no effect since it would lead every plaintiff to claim in excess of $50,000 in the first instance. I do not think that the consequence is as severe as counsel feared. Often, the quantum of damages may only become evident after the judge has assessed damages. The quantum awarded may be $10,000 and the plaintiff though dissatisfied with $10,000 may nonetheless accept that it would not be more than $50,000. Conversely, the plaintiff may be awarded $60,000 and does not appeal, but the defendant, on the other hand may say that the award should not be more than $30,000. That is why the Court of Appeal in the Augustine case alluded to the point that it may depend on who the party appealing is, and on that basis, distinguished Anthony s/o Savarimuthu v Soh Chuan Tin [1989] SLR 607. The relevance of the party intending to appeal is that the amount in dispute so far as one...