Ho Tong Cheong and Others v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd

• Court: Federal Court (Singapore)
• Judge: M Buttrose J
• Judgment Date: 06 April 1967
• Neutral Citation: [1967] SGFC 7
• Citation: [1967] SGFC 7
• Defendant Counsel: SHD Elias (Elias Brothers)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Tan Peng Khoo (Oehlers & Chua)
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No Y48 of 1966
• Date: 06 April 1967
• Subject Matter: Onus of proving fact especially within knowledge of person,Unfavourable presumption against withholding evidence,Presumptions,Appellants carrying out building operations on controlled premises in breach of statute,Whether breaches knowingly committed,Landlord and Tenant,Respondent seeking recovery of possession,Sections 14 and 15(1)(h) Control of Rent Ordinance (Cap 242, 1955 Rev Ed),Section 107 Evidence Ordinance (Cap 4, 1955 Rev Ed),Proof of evidence,Effect of election to call no evidence at trial,Section 115(g) Evidence Ordinance (Cap 4, 1955 Rev Ed),Evidence,Section 144(7), 144(10) and 144(12) Municipal Ordinance 1935 (No 59 of 1935),Onus of proof,Recovery of possession,Whether breaches exposing landlord to any penalty, fine or forfeiture

In this action the plaintiff claimed possession of premises at No 203, South Bridge Road, Singapore, of which the defendants were monthly tenants on the ground that they had knowingly committed breaches of the Municipal Ordinance (SS Cap 133) and the Building By-laws made thereunder affecting the premises which exposed the plaintiff to a penalty or fine.

Section 14 of the Control of Rent Ordinance (Cap 242), (hereinafter referred to as `the Ordinance`), provides that `no order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any premises comprised in a tenancy shall be made or given except in the cases set out in this Part of this Ordinance`.

The plaintiff claimed it was entitled to possession under s 15(1)(h) of the Ordinance which reads as follows:

In the case of all premises such an order or judgment as is referred to in s 14 of this Ordinance may be made in any of the following cases, namely:

(h) where the tenant or any other person occupying the premises under him has knowingly committed a breach of any written law regulating any business carried on upon the premises or of any provision of the Municipal Ordinance or of any rule or by-law made thereunder affecting the premises which exposes the landlord to any penalty, fine or forfeiture.

The plaintiff`s case was that by virtue of s 144(12) of the Municipal Ordinance (SS Cap 133) which was in force at the material time, namely, in July 1961, the building operations commenced or carried out by the defendants were deemed to have been commenced or carried out by it and it was liable for breaches and by s 144(10) of the same Ordinance it was liable to a fine and a mandatory order might be made requiring it to alter or demolish the building.

The defendants admitted that they commenced and carried out the building operations particulars of which were set out in the statement of claim and that the work was commenced and completed in July 1961. Further it was not in dispute that the defendants carried out the work without submitting a plan to the proper authority or that there was a breach of s 144(7) of the Municipal Ordinance or that the work carried out constituted breaches of the Building By-laws.

It was argued that it had not been established in this case that the defendants committed the breaches `knowingly` as required by the section. This raised a clear cut issue of fact and was dealt with by the trial judge in this way:

In this case the evidence is that in November 1960, the defendants submitted a plan signed by themselves, their architect and the plaintiffs to the proper authority. The plan was for the alteration to the shop front of the premises. In April 1961, an amended plan was submitted. Both these plans show an unauthorised glass corrugated iron lean-to roof over the open area at the back of the premises which was to be demolished. The plans were approved on 21 November 1960 and 19 May 1961 respectively. In July 1961, the defendants carried out the building operations over the open area at the back of the premises knowing full well that a covering over the open area was illegal. There is no doubt about it that the defendants committed the breaches knowingly.

I am unable to find any reason for disturbing the trial judge`s finding of fact with which I am in complete agreement.

In the light of this...