Gurpreet Gill Maag v Chubb Insurance Singapore Limited

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 02 January 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] SGDC 6
• Court: District Court (Singapore)
• Parties: Gurpreet Gill Maag,Chubb Insurance Singapore Limited

Gurpreet Gill Maag v Chubb Insurance Singapore Limited

[2026] SGDC 6

District Court Originating Application No 30 of 2025

Gurpreet Gill Maag

Chubb Insurance Singapore Limited

District Court

Chiah Kok Khun

Insurance - Homeowner’s insurance policy - Personal liability coverage - Insurer’s duty to defend the insured against claims - Insured sued by business associate - Whether insurer liable to indemnify insured against damages arising from suit - Whether insurer’s duty to defend insured against suit is separate from duty to indemnify her against damages - Whether insurer’s liability to indemnify insured against damages excluded under policy

Mr Suang Wijaya and Mr Hamza Zafar Malik (Eugene Thuraisingham LLP) for the applicant

Mr Kevin Kwek Yiu Wing, Ms Charmaine Elizabeth Ong Wan Qi and Mr Sourish Sinha (Legal Solutions LLC) for the respondent.

2 January 2026

Judgment reserved.

District Judge Chiah Kok Khun:

Introduction

1. The respondent is an insurer. The applicant is insured with the respondent under a Chubb Masterpiece Insurance Policy with a policy period from 21 January 2023 to 21 January 2024 (the “Policy”). The Policy is essentially a homeowner’s insurance policy. The applicant is applying for a declaration that the respondent is obliged under the defence coverages provision of the Policy to defend her against a counterclaim brought in a High Court suit (“OC 823”) against her. The applicant also applies for a declaration that no exclusions under the Policy apply to exclude the respondent’s obligation to defend; and an order for parties to agree on the costs of defending the counterclaim to be paid by the respondent, failing which such costs are to be assessed by the court.

2. The respondent’s case is that whilst the insuring clause under the Policy has been triggered, coverage is excluded due to several exclusions under the Policy.¹ These would be the business pursuits exclusion, and the director’s liability exclusion. The respondent is therefore under no duty to defend the applicant. The respondent also contends that the applicant is not entitled to bring this application as she has failed to comply with various conditions under the Policy.²

3. For the reasons below, I am dismissing the application.

Issues to be determined

4. The issues to be decided by me in this case are as follows:

• (a) Whether the respondent’s duty to defend the applicant is separate from its duty to indemnify her against damages.

• (b) Whether the respondent’s liability under the Policy to indemnify the applicant against damages is excluded by the following exclusions in the defence coverages provision:

  • (i) the business pursuits exclusion; or

  • (ii) the director’s liability exclusion.

Analysis and findings

The respondent’s duty to defend is not separate from its duty to indemnify against damages

5. I will first deal with the question of the relationship between the respondent’s duty to defend and its duty to indemnify. The applicant appears to advance in the oral submissions before me, and in her further written submissions the line of argument that the respondent’s duty to defend the applicant under the Policy is broader than its duty to indemnify the applicant against damages. In other words, the applicant asserts that the respondent is liable for the costs of defending the applicant against a lawsuit even if the liability for that lawsuit may not be covered under the Policy.³

6. The starting place for the examination of the question is the Policy. There are two provisions that are relevant. The first is the insuring clause of the personal liability coverage section of the Policy, which reads as follows:⁴

This part of Your Masterpiece Policy provides You with personal liability coverage for which You or a family member may be legally responsible anywhere in the world subject to the terms, conditions and exclusions stated in the Policy.

7. The other is the defence coverages provision (“Defence Coverages provision”). It is one of the coverages included in the personal liability coverages. It states as follows:⁵

We will defend a Covered person against any suit seeking covered Damages for personal injury or property damage. We provide this defence at Our own expense, with counsel of Our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent. We may investigate, negotiate and settle any such claim or suit at Our discretion.

8. I turn to the general principles relating to the construction of homeowner’s insurance contracts. It would appear that there is a dearth of local case authorities on the interpretation of homeowner’s insurance contracts. Both sides referred me only to authorities from foreign jurisdictions, in particular Canadian caselaw. In regard to the question at hand of the relationship between the duty of an insurer to defend and the duty to indemnify, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd's London v. Scalera [2000] 1 S.C.R 55112 (“Scalera”) provides direct guidance. As in the present case, the decision concerns a homeowner’s insurance policy, containing similar provisions. The Supreme Court stated at [49] as follows:

• 49 An insurance company's duty to defend is related to its duty to indemnify. A homeowner's insurance policy entitles the holder to have the insurer indemnify any liability falling within the policy's terms. Since the insurance company will be paying these costs, it has also developed the right — now a duty — to conduct the defence of such claims. However, the duty to defend is not so great that it is presumed to be independent of the duty to indemnify. Absent express language to the contrary, the duty to defend extends only to claims that could potentially trigger indemnity under the policy. Therefore if an insurance policy, like the one in this case, excludes liability arising from intentionally caused injuries, there will be no duty to defend intentional torts.

9. As seen, it was held that the duty of the insurer to defend is not “so great” that it is presumed to be independent of its duty to indemnify. In the absence of express language to the contrary, the duty to defend extends only to claims that could potentially trigger indemnity under the policy. The case concerns a policy that excluded liability arising from intentionally caused injuries. It was held that therefore there would be no duty to defend intentional torts. In other words, the duty to defend the insured from an action only arises if there is a duty of the insurer to indemnify liability arising from that action.

10. This principle is echoed in another Supreme Court of Canada case. In Nichols v. American Home Assurance Co., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 801 (S.C.C.) (“Nichols”), it was held the duty to defend imposed by the defence clause is restricted to claims for damages which fall within the scope of the policy. Nichols is of especial relevance to the present case because it discussed the interaction of the exclusion clauses in the policy with the duty to defend. The application of exclusions clauses in the present case is a matter I will turn to below. The Supreme Court stated in Nichols at [14] as follows:

• 14 I conclude that the duty to defend imposed by the defence clause is unambiguously restricted to claims for damages which fall within the scope of the policy. Since damages for fraud do not fall within the policy, one never arrives at the stage of inquiring as to whether there may be an ambiguity in the exclusion clause relevant to the duty to defend. I do not think it amiss, however, to set out my view of the relationship of the exclusion clause to the defence clause, for it is only in reading the policy as a whole that its true intention can be ascertained. As I read the policy, the exclusion clause is primarily concerned with the duty to indemnify. For this reason, it refers to actual acts or omissions, which are the precondition of the duty to indemnify. The scope of the duty to indemnify, in turn, triggers the application of the defence clause, through use of the phrase in the defence clause limiting the duty to claims for "damages which are or may be payable under the terms of this Policy". The duty to defend, unlike the duty to indemnify, is triggered not by actual acts or omissions, but by allegations, applying "even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent". Thus the scope of the duty to defend is not conditioned directly by the exclusion clause, but only indirectly through that clause's definition of the scope of coverage. The error in the Court of Appeal's reasoning lies in attempting to make the exclusion clause directly applicable to the duty to defend, and then concluding that since the exclusion does not refer to allegations as opposed to acts and omissions, allegations of fraud are not excluded from the duty to defend.

11. As seen, after holding that the duty to defend imposed by the defence clause is unequivocally restricted to claims for damages which fall within the scope of the policy, the Supreme Court went on to discuss the interface of the exclusion clause in the policy to the defence clause. In this regard, it was held that the policy must be read as a whole, and the exclusion clause was deemed to be primarily concerned with the duty to indemnify. The scope of the duty to indemnify, in turn, triggers the application of the defence clause. The scope of the duty to defend is therefore not conditioned directly by the exclusion clause, but only indirectly through that clause's definition of the scope of coverage. In other words, the Supreme Court held that exclusion clauses are not directly determinative of the question of whether there is a duty to defend. Instead, whether there is a duty to defend the insured in an action is determined by whether there is a duty to indemnify him against liability arising from that action.

12. It therefore follows from the...