Great Eastern General Insurance Ltd and another v Next of kin of Maripan Ponnusamy, deceased

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Andre Maniam JC
• Judgment Date: 05 August 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] SGHC 163
• Plaintiff Counsel: Hong Heng Leong (Just Law LLC)
• Docket Number: Tribunal Appeal No 21 of 2019
• Date: 05 August 2020
• Hearing Date: 09 June 2020
• Subject Matter: Work Injury Compensation Act,Employment Law
• Published date: 08 August 2020
• Defendant Counsel: Lalwani Anil Mangan and Ng Yuan Sheng (DL Law Corporation)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Citation: [2020] SGHC 163
• Year: 2020

Andre Maniam JC: Introduction

The appellants challenged an award of work injury compensation in favour of the respondents, who were the next of kin of the deceased, Mr Maripan Ponnusamy (“Mr Maripan”). Mr Maripan had been employed as a security officer by the second appellant (“Pavo”). The first appellant was Pavo’s work injury compensation insurer.

On 5 December 2017, Mr Maripan fell and hit his head whilst patrolling premises as part of his work. This caused tetraparesis from cervical spine injury (“the injury”). He was 65 years old at the time.

Two weeks later, Mr Maripan submitted a work injury compensation claim pursuant to the Work Injury Compensation Act (Cap 354, 2009 Rev Ed) (“the Act”). A notice of assessment was issued in his favour on the basis of permanent incapacity. The appellants objected, contending that Mr Maripan had not suffered personal injury “by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment” within s 3(1) of the Act.

The case proceeded to a hearing before an Assistant Commissioner (“the Commissioner”), but before that hearing Mr Maripan passed away from bacterial pneumonia, and his next of kin continued as the claimants.

The Commissioner heard evidence, including medical evidence, from both sides and allowed the claim for compensation.

Issues to be determined

The appellants challenged the Commissioner’s decision on some 31 grounds, the first of which was: “[t]hat the Learned Assistant Commissioner for Labour had erred in law and in fact in deciding that Mr Maripan’s accident (for which the work injury compensation was initially awarded) arose out of and in the course of Mr Maripan’s employment”. The appellants’ other grounds of appeal were an elaboration on the various ways in which they contended that the Commissioner had erred.

After hearing submissions and reserving my decision, I dismiss the appellants’ challenge to the Commissioner’s decision.

In doing so, I considered the following issues: What is a “substantial question of law” such that an appeal lies under s 29(2A) of the Act? Did the Commissioner commit any appealable error in finding that there was an “accident” within s 3(1) of the Act? Did the Commissioner commit any appealable error in finding that the accident arose in the course of employment within s 3(1) of the Act? Did the Commissioner commit any appealable error in finding that the accident arose out of employment within s 3(1) read with s 3(6) of the Act?

What is a “substantial question of law” such that an appeal lies under s 29(2A) of the Act?

Section 29(2A) of the Act provides as follows: “No appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and the amount in dispute is not less than $1,000.”

As to what a “substantial question of law” is for the purposes of s 29(2A) of the Act, I respectfully agree with the decision of Kan Ting Chiu J in Karuppiah Ravichandran v GDS Engineering Pte Ltd and another [2009] 3 SLR(R) 1028 (“Karuppiah”) at [13]–[15], citing Halsbury’s Laws of England vol 1(1) (Butterworths, 4th Ed Reissue, 1989) at paragraph 70 and Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14 (“Edwards”) at 35–36.

Errors of law that may justify an appeal include “misinterpretation of a statute”, “taking irrelevant considerations into account”, and “failing to take relevant considerations into account”; but as cautioned by Kan J in Karuppiah at [15]: “I do not think the passage from Halsbury means that any one of the listed errors would constitute a sufficient error of law for an appeal. The nature and effect of the error should be considered and there will be appeals when there are errors which have a bearing on the ultimate decision. For the present purposes, the requirement for there to be a substantial question of law makes that abundantly clear.” [emphasis in original in italics; emphasis added in bold italics]

Additionally, as Kan J recognised at [16] of Karuppiah, an appeal is also permissible if, citing Edwards at 36, “the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination upon appeal” [emphasis in original omitted], which Kan J paraphrased as follows: “… findings that no person would have come to if he had applied the law properly”.

I refer to substantial errors of law such that an appeal lies, as “appealable errors”. The appellants argued that there were appealable errors in the present case. Indeed, in the absence of appealable errors no appeal shall lie – the court cannot simply decide the matter afresh and arrive at its own decision.

In reviewing the Commissioner’s findings, my focus is thus on whether the Commissioner committed appealable errors.

Did the Commissioner commit any appealable error in finding that there was an “accident” within s 3(1) of the Act?

The evidence, and in particular the medical evidence, showed that Mr Maripan had had a syncope (fainting spell), and that is what the Commissioner found.

The appellants contended that this was not an “accident” within s 3(1) of the Act, and that the Commissioner committed an appealable error in finding that it was. The appellants’ case was that Mr Maripan had pre-existing medical conditions (in particular, hypertension and diabetes) that made it more likely for him to faint.

From his grounds of decision (“GD”) at [23], the Commissioner duly considered the case of NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Ltd and another v Next of kin of Narayasamy s/o Ramasamy, deceased [2006] 4 SLR(R) 507 (“Narayasamy”), from which he gleaned (amongst others) the following propositions: “Accident” would include an internal medical condition that caused an unexpected injury while the employee was carrying out work (Narayasamy at [24]). Whether there was an “accident” should be assessed from the point of view of the employee (Narayasamy at [30]).

Narayasamy has been followed in several other decisions, including Arpah bte Sabar and others v Colex Environmental Pte Ltd [2019] 5 SLR 509 (“Arpah”), which the Commissioner cited for its reference to the Oxford English Dictionary definition of “accident”. I would add that the court in Arpah had cited the dictionary definition for the ordinary meaning of “accident” after considering the statement in Narayasamy that an accident “would include an internal medical condition that caused an unexpected medical injury”.

The interpretation of “accident” in Narayasamy to include “an internal medical condition that caused an unexpected injury while the employee was carrying out work” is explicable in relation to the nature and purpose of the Act. As noted in Pang Chew Kim (next of kin of Poon Wai Tong, deceased) v Wartsila Singapore Pte Ltd and another [2012] 1 SLR 15 (“Pang”) at [27], the Act is “a piece of social legislation” that “should be interpreted purposively in favour of employees who have suffered injury during their employment”. That being the case, the system established by the Act is “not a ‘fault-based’ compensation system” (Hauque Enamul v China Taiping Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another [2018] 5 SLR 485 (“Hauque”) at [65]). Instead, the Act is meant to avail employees of compensation where they have sustained injuries in workplace accidents, “even if there is no one at fault for causing that injury, or even if he had himself been responsible for the mishap that caused him injury” (Chua Jian Construction and another v Zhao Xiaojuan (deputy for Qian Guo Liang) [2018] SGHC 98 (“Chua Jian Construction”) at [10]).

Whether Mr Maripan was more prone to fainting is therefore quite beside the point. Under the Act, the court is not concerned with attributing fault. In determining if there was an “accident” within s 3(1) of the Act, the court’s chief concern is whether there was “an untoward event that was not designed” (Hauque at [65]). In this case, there was.

In the following cases, our courts have accepted heart attacks and/or cardiac arrests as being “accidents” within s 3(1) of the Act: Narayasamy; Arpah; Pang; and Allianz Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd and others v Ma Shoudong and another [2011] 3 SLR 1167 (“Ma Shoudong”). The fact that the claimant has an internal medical condition does not mean that what happened to him was not an “accident”.

Narayasamy ([17] supra) also contained a quote from Lord Loreburn LC’s judgment (on behalf of the majority) in Clover Clayton & Co, Limited v Hughes [1910] AC 242 at 245–246, which is particularly apposite for its references to fainting (which the present case concerns). There the House of Lords was considering rupture of an aneurism, an internal and pre-existing medical condition, and his Lordship said:

The first question here is whether or not the learned judge was entitled to regard the rupture as an “accident” within the meaning of this Act. In my opinion, he was so entitled … I cannot agree with the argument presented to your Lordships that you are to ask whether a doctor acquainted with the man’s condition would have expected it. Were that the right view, then it would not be an accident if a man very liable to fainting fits fell in a faint from a ladder and hurt himself. No doubt the ordinary accident is associated with something external; the bursting of a boiler, or an explosion in a mine, for example. But it may be merely from the main’s own miscalculation, such as tripping and falling. Or it may be due both to internal and external conditions, as if a seaman were to faint in the rigging and tumble into the sea. I think it may also be something going wrong within the human frame itself, such as the straining of a muscle or the breaking of a...