Goh Swee Fang and Others v Tiah Juah Kim

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeWarren Khoo L H J
Judgment Date12 October 1994
Neutral Citation[1994] SGCA 118
Date01 July 1994
Docket NumberCivil Appeal No 32 of 1993
Year1994
Published date19 September 2003
Plaintiff CounselMichael Hwang and Tan Chuan Thye (Allen & Gledhill )
Citation[1994] SGCA 118
Defendant CounselJoe Chellam and TU Naidu (Palakrishnan & Pnrs)
CourtCourt of Appeal (Singapore)
Subject MatterWhether transfer should be set aside,Equity of person to whom duty is owed to be secured by charge ranking after that of innocent third parties,Knowing assistance by third party,Whether representee entitled in equity to share in proceeds or in property,Resulting trusts,Whether breached,Status of sale below market price,Equity,Transfer of land in breach resulting in innocent third parties gaining indefeasible interest in land,Whether presumption arising,Fiduciary relationships,Estoppel,Liability to compensate person to whom duty is owed,Proprietary estoppel,Whether transaction valid,Representation by owner of property that representee entitled to half share in proceeds of property,Transfer of land for consideration,Trusts,Breach of fiduciary duty,Whether intention of transferor in doubt,Presumed resulting trusts,Strangers to breach,Consideration never received,Representor's fiduciary duty to sell property at market price,Representee relying on representation to his detriment,Duties

Cur Adv Vult

The parties to the present litigation are closely related to each other. The first appellant is the mother of the respondent and the second appellant, and the third appellant is the wife of the second appellant; the second appellant is the younger brother of the respondent. The dispute centred on an undivided half share of the property, known as 101, Jalan Mastuli, Singapore (the property). Before us, the appellants accepted the findings of fact made by the learned trial judge, with one exception which we shall deal with in a moment. Accordingly, for our purpose, we respectfully adopt the facts as found by the learned trial judge.

The genesis of the dispute may be traced back to events which occurred some 30 years ago.
In the 1960s, the first appellant, her husband and her children, including the respondent, lived at 161-Y, Lorong Ah Soo, which was an attap squatter hut. The respondent is the eldest son of the family. In 1962, the respondent left school after having completed the Senior Cambridge Examination and commenced working as a clerk. Later, in 1964 he changed his employment and worked for the British with what was then known as the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works. Admittedly, the whole family was very hardworking. The family turned the attap hut into a farmhouse rearing pigs and chickens. The first appellant herself worked as a maid for some British servicemen. The respondent`s eldest sister, Chia Lang Yang, and his younger sister, Tiah Boon Tah, also worked as maids. Situate at Charlton Park, which is about ten minutes` walk from Lorong Ah Soo, was a housing estate then under development. One day in 1964 or thereabouts, the first appellant approached the respondent and suggested that they should purchase a house in the housing estate. Prior to that she had approached her husband but the latter declined. The respondent agreed to the first appellant`s suggestions. Accordingly, both of them proceeded to the site office where the respondent selected the property, which was the cheapest two-storey terrace house available and was priced at $24,500. They each paid $500 as the booking fee. Subsequent progress payments were made from their own funds and they did not take a loan to finance the purchase. The property was completed in late 1969 and was conveyed to them as tenants-in-common in equal shares. Subsequently, in 1970, the property was brought under the Land Titles Act and a certificate of title was issued in due course.

The property was first let out at a rental of $300 per month.
The tenant vacated the property in 1972 and thereafter certain renovations were carried out to the property. In January 1973, the respondent got married and moved into the property with the entire family of the first appellant. However, friction soon arose between the respondent`s wife and the first appellant; the latter was described by the trial judge as `a difficult and domineering woman`. The relationship between the two of them deteriorated. The respondent was inevitably drawn into the acrimony between his wife and the first appellant and there were instances when the quarrels became very heated. The two sisters (Chia Lang Yang and Tiah Boon Tah) and the second and third appellants took sides with the mother in the dispute. The respondent`s father was seriously ill at the material time and did not involve himself in the intrigues of the household, leaving the running of it to the first appellant.

Things eventually came to a head.
On 25 March 1973, an incident took place; the learned trial judge called this the `revolver incident`. At that time, the respondent was doing his National Service in the police force and was assigned to do beat duty with a revolver issued by his station armoury. While on duty on that day, he received a call from the second appellant inquiring when he would be moving out from the property and requesting the respondent to return home that evening for a discussion, which the respondent did. In the midst of the discussion, the respondent told the second appellant that the latter could not ask him to move out as he was a part owner of the house. A heated quarrel then ensued during which the second appellant challenged the respondent to draw his revolver which the respondent did. The father ran out of the house and called the police. The police arrived and the respondent was taken into police custody that night on the complaint made by the father.

On the following day, in the morning, the first appellant went to the police station and instructed the respondent to go to her lawyer`s office to transfer his share of the property to her, for which he would be paid $20,000.
The respondent replied that he did not know who the lawyer was and where his office was. The first appellant then gave him a document, which was an acknowledgement of receipt of title deeds, to identify himself to the lawyer and said that she would arrange for a close family friend to bring him there. He accepted the offer and said he would go. He was released from police custody that day when the complaint made by his father was withdrawn. By this time, the respondent`s wife had removed all their belongings from the property and had shifted into their new home at 682 Serangoon Road, which belonged to his wife`s friend.

On the next day, ie 27 March 1973, the respondent met with the family friend, one Wong Soon Tong (Wong), at the latter`s bookstore, who then brought him to the office of a solicitor, Tan See Swan (Tan), at People`s Park.
At the office, Wong informed Tan that the respondent had come to sign the transfer. Tan then produced two documents for the respondent to sign: one was a transfer and the other a receipt for $20,000. He signed the transfer and the receipt and asked Tan for the money. Tan replied that he had no money to pay to him and that he (the respondent) should get it from the first appellant. The respondent on hearing this said he would not give Tan the receipt; he took the receipt and left the office. Following the transfer of the property, there were demands from the respondent for the sum of $20,000 but the first appellant constantly stalled, saying that she had no money and that he would be given his half share when the property was eventually sold. The respondent appeared to have agreed to that arrangement, albeit presumably with some reluctance.

In 1985, the first appellant telephoned the respondent requesting him to engage a contractor to carry out some renovations to the property, namely, to tile the car porch and pillars and the rear part of the kitchen.
He procured a contractor for her and the contractor carried out the works as required by her. For these works, the contractor sent her a bill for $2,400. She paid $1,900 and requested the contractor to collect the balance from the respondent. The contractor accordingly approached the respondent for the balance which the respondent paid.

In 1988, the first appellant made arrangements to sell the property to another son, Chia Juan Meng for $300,000.
However the sale was abortive. Juan Meng`s evidence was that the first appellant had initially informed him that the property was to be a gift but when he went to the office of Tan to sign the relevant documents he discovered that he had to pay $300,000 as the purchase price for the property. As he had no money to pay for the property, he did not proceed with the transaction. The learned trial judge surmised that the more probable reason for Juan Meng withdrawing from the transaction was that the first appellant had sought to reserve for herself a life interest in the property and it was the prospect of having to live with her for the rest of her days which made him decide not to proceed with the transaction.

In January 1989, the first appellant informed the respondent that she intended to sell the house to the second appellant for $150,000.
The respondent objected and demanded his half share. The first appellant stated that it was a gift to the second appellant and that as the house was in her name she could dispose of it as she liked. The respondent then approached the second appellant and demanded for his share in the property and the second appellant told him to get it from the first appellant. The respondent then instructed Chiam & Co, who wrote a letter dated 21 March 1989 to the first appellant which stated that:

(1) The property was bought jointly by the respondent and the first appellant sometime in 1968 and each had paid half of the purchase price.

(2) When the respondent was married he moved out of the above house to set up a home with his wife.

(3) The respondent transferred his half share in the property to the first appellant on condition that when she sold the property she was to repay him one-half share of the sale price.

(4) The respondent claimed $75,000 as being half of the sale price of $150,000.



To this letter the first appellant through her solicitors Tan See Swan & Co replied denying the allegations and in particular para (iii) thereof.


The first appellant went ahead with her plan.
On 8 June 1989, she transferred the property to the second and third appellants for a consideration which was expressed in the transfer as $315,000. Two loans totalling $150,000 were obtained from the Central Provident Fund Board (CPF Board) and Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd (the bank) which were secured by mortgages on the property and the amount of $150,000 was paid to the first appellant. A cheque for $165,000 being the balance sum, was issued by the second appellant to the first appellant but was never encashed, as the second appellant did not have sufficient funds in his bank account to meet this amount. The learned trial judge found that the balance of the purchase price of $165,000 was never intended to be paid to the first appellant and rejected the appellants` feeble contention that the $165,000 was to be paid by monthly instalments of $400...

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9 cases
  • Yeo Kia Yong and Others v Yeo Kia Hock
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 17 June 1998
    ...conveyance transfers no beneficial or equitable interest in my opinion. 66.Thus, the case of Goh Swee Fang & Ors v Tiah Juah Kim [1994] 3 SLR 881 cited to me by defendant`s counsel could be distinguished on the basis that there was in fact an agreement for the respondent to transfer his hal......
  • Low Heng Leon Andy v Low Kian Beng Lawrence
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 10 May 2013
    ...649; [1998] 1 SLR 374 (folld) Goh Nellie v Goh Lian Teck [2007] 1 SLR (R) 453; [2007] 1 SLR 453 (folld) Goh Swee Fang v Tiah Juah Kim [1994] 3 SLR (R) 556; [1994] 3 SLR 881 (folld) Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; (1843) 67 ER 313 (folld) Indian Overseas Bank v Motorcycle Industries......
  • Hong Leong Singapore Finance Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 23 November 2006
    ...he noted that Willmott was not cited at all in some cases (see eg, the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Goh Swee Fang v Tiah Juah Kim [1994] 3 SLR 881 and Tan Bee Giok v Loh Kum Yong [1997] 1 SLR 153) and in others where it was cited, the analysis was not conducted on the basis of the fi......
  • Hong Leong Singapore Finance Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 23 November 2006
    ...he noted that Willmott was not cited at all in some cases (see eg, the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Goh Swee Fang v Tiah Juah Kim [1994] 3 SLR 881 and Tan Bee Giok v Loh Kum Yong [1997] 1 SLR 153) and in others where it was cited, the analysis was not conducted on the basis of the fi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • UNDUE INFLUENCE, UNCONSCIONABILITY AND GOOD FAITH
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Journal No. 1996, December 1996
    • 1 December 1996
    ...v Choong Lye Hock Estates Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 206 (CA). See also Teh Poh Wah v Seremban Securities Sdn Bhd[1996] 1 MLJ 701 (CA). 143 [1994] 3 SLR 881. 144 Contra Hussey v Palmer[1972] 1 WLR 1286. 145 (1995) 7 S Ac LJ 195. 146 See eg Commonwealth v Verwayensupra n 124. The Court of Appeal c......
  • Equity and Trust
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2000, December 2000
    • 1 December 2000
    ...that a gift or an express trust or sale was intended, then no question of a resulting trust arises (see Goh Swee Fang v Tiah Juah Kim[1994] 3 SLR 881). However, it is only if no intention may be discerned that the law presumes a resulting trust. Such an analysis is consistent with the House......
  • A TALE OF THE TIAHS AND THE FLEXIBILITY OF EQUITY:
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Journal No. 1995, December 1995
    • 1 December 1995
    ...decision of the Court of Appeal would then be an example of the flexibility of the equitable remedy within the existing parameters. † [1994] 3 SLR 881 * The trial judge rejected the contention of son, JP and MH that it was to be paid by monthly instalments. 1 [1994] 3 SLR 881 at pp. 890, 89......

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