Public Prosecutor v Goh Lee Yin and Another Appeal

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: V K Rajah JA
• Judgment Date: 29 November 2007
• Neutral Citation: [2007] SGHC 205
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 112 of 2005,Magistrate's Appeals Nos 88 of 2007 and 112 of 2005
• Date: 29 November 2007
• Published date: 03 December 2007
• Year: 2007
• Plaintiff Counsel: Lau Wing Yum and Shawn Ho (Attorney-General's Chambers)
• Citation: [2007] SGHC 205
• Defendant Counsel: Spencer Gwee (Spencer Gwee & Co)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Sentencing considerations applicable to kleptomaniacs,Property,Theft,Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Criminal Law,Sentencing,Offences,Mentally disordered offenders

29 November 2007 Judgment reserved.

V K Rajah JA

Introduction

1 Advances in medical science have made the validation and accurate diagnosis of more psychiatric disorders practicable and more reliable. This has brought into sharper focus, the extent, if at all, a psychiatric disorder can be relevant in sentencing an offender. In discharging their responsibilities, the courts have a vital social-control role to fulfil in superintending mentally-disordered persons after they are convicted. Such illnesses can be a mitigating consideration or point towards a future danger that may require more severe sentencing. This is the paradox of sentencing the mentally ill. The courts have often to juggle and assess contradictory sentencing objectives in order to protect society and rehabilitate the offender, if feasible.

2 There has of course been an understandable anxiety amongst the prosecuting authorities that potential offenders may unduly take refuge from their culpability under the guise of being afflicted by “pseudo” psychiatric disorders and thereby be absolved of substantial legal responsibility for the offences they commit. In addition, there is also an inarticulate concern that the courts may in the process of acknowledging the existence of an impulse disorder, veer towards sanctioning a “culture of victimhood” and thereby open up Pandora’s Box. These worries are misplaced. The courts will painstakingly assess all such cases. On the one hand, the law will not condone any acts of pretence. On the other hand, the offence often assumes a wholly different dimension once it is acknowledged that the diagnosis is accurate and the offender is, in actuality, labouring under some serious psychiatric disorder during the commission of the offence. There are times when the offender though not legally insane may succumb to the urges, inherent in certain serious psychiatric (and biological) disorders, to commit an offence. Such an illness may so affect and alter the state of the mind that the consequences of an act fade into irrelevance in the offender’s mind. Ought the law then to adopt a thoroughly uncompromising approach and invariably throw the book, so to speak, at such offenders notwithstanding their unfortunate circumstances? Is it not in the public interest for the offender to be rehabilitated, whenever practicable, so that he or she can resume a normal life and contribute to society? These questions, in turn, usually resolve themselves into two sub-issues: First, what is the extent of legal responsibility for the transgression that such an offender had at the material time? Secondly, what is the appropriate punishment that will maintain a fair and principled equilibrium in each matter between the interests of the public and that of the offender?

3 The present appeals brings into sharp focus, the psychiatric ailment of kleptomania, which has been described as an impulse control disorder, characterised by a recurrent failure to control and resist impulses to steal objects, including objects not generally needed for personal use (see [61] below). In my view, there is a need for the courts to adopt a broadly consistent and coherent approach in dealing with offenders who suffer from kleptomania. In this judgment, I shall attempt to provide some general guidance outlining the sentencing considerations which should be taken into account in cases of this nature. However, before I deal with these principles in greater detail, it would be both appropriate and necessary to set out the facts of the present case at some length. For convenience, I now set out the schematic layout that I have adopted in this judgment:

(I)	Introduction ……………………………………………………...............	1
(II)	The facts ……………………………………………..……....................	6
	(A) Background ………………..…………….......................	6
	(B) First series of offences of theft in a dwelling ….................	8
	(a) Background facts …………………..............	8
	(b) Proceedings in the District Court ...................	9
	(1) Dr Goh’s report …..................................	9
	(2) Dr Tan’s report ……..............................	11
	(c) The decision of the District Court ..............................	12
	(d) The appeal against the District Court’s sentence ........	13
	(1) The probation report .…….…………..	14
	(2) The Hight Court’s decision .....................	15
	(C) The offences of theft in dwelling in the present case ...................	17
	(a) Background facts .………………..............................	17
	(b) Proceedings in the District Court ..…...........................	19
	(1) Psychological progress report .................	19
	(2) Dr Phang’s report ….............................	21
	(3) Dr Tan’s report ..…….............................	23
	(4) The progress report ................................	24
	(c) The decision of the District Court …...………............	25
(III)	The appeal …………………………………………..………...……................	26
	(A) The parties’ submissions ………………….……..………...……..................	26
	(a) The Prosecution’s submissions ..………...……...........................	26
	(b) The respondent’s submissions ..………..……................................	28
	(B) The psychiatric expert’ evidence ….…………..……….……......................	28
	(C) The issues ……………………………...….…….……......................	29
(IV)	Principles applicable in determining appropriate sentence in this case ....................	30
	(A) General principles of sentencing ……….......………….….......................	30
	(B) The psychiatric disorder of kleptomania …....…..…………..........................	31
	(a) The nature of kleptomania …………….…....................................	31
	(b) The incidence of kleptomania ..……………....................................	33
	(c) The treatment of kleptomania ..…..……....................................	34
	(d) The respondent’s diagnosis of kleptomania …..….…...…..……...	36
	(C) The need for deterrence and rehabilitation in case involving kleptomaniacs .....	37
	(a) Deterrence ………..………..……................................	37
	(1) Specific deterrence ..……..........................................	37
	(i) the theory of “undeterribility” ...............	38
	(ii) the correlation between primary and secondary specific deterrence ..…….............	40
	(iii) specific deterrence to assume greater relevance in cases involving kleptomaniacs when treatment is persistently disregarded .....	42
	(2) General deterrence .......….……...…....................	44
	(i) general irrelevance of general deterrence in cases involving kleptomaniacs ................	44
	(ii) general irrelevance of general deterrence does not extend to non kleptomaniac offenders ......................................................	48
	(b) Rehabilitation ………………….................................................	48
	(1) Purpose of rehabilitation …......…...............................	49
	(2) Suitability of rehabilitation ....……..............................	50
	(3) Option for rehabilitation ........…….............................	51
	(i) rehabilitative sentences in the United Kingdom ....................................................	51
	(ii) need for sentencing options to cater to the rehabilitation of kleptomaniac offenders in Singapore .....................................................	52
	(c) Incapacitation …….....………............……..............................	53
	(D) Previous sentencing precedents …………............……...........................	55
	(a) Singapore cases ……………............……..................................	55
	(1) Siauw Yin Hee ............……......................................	55
	(2) PP v Zhang Jing ............……..................................	56
	(3) PP v Zhang Jing No 2 ……..................................	58
	(b) Other jurisdictions …………..............……....................................	60
	(1) Australia ….............……......................................	60
	(2) Canada ………..........…….......................................	63
	(3) Hong Kong ……………..........……..........................	66
	(4) summary of the approach of other jurisdictions ..........	66
	(E) General framework for dealing with cases involving kleptomaniac ...................	67
	(a) Probation normally for properly diagnosed kleptomaniacs ...............	67
	(b) Incarceration possible for re-offenders who demonstrate disregard for treatment ............................................................	68
	(c) Sensible prosecution ………….............…..............................	68
(VI)	The appropriate sentence in the present case ………..........……........................	69
	(A) Deterrence ………………….…………………..........…….......................	70
	(B) Rehabilitation ………………….……………............……............................	71
(VII)	Breach of probation order ………………….………….......…............................	72
(VIII)	Conclusion ………………….…………………….......……................................	73

The facts

Background

4 The respondent (in Magistrate’s Appeal No 88 of 2007), Goh Lee Yin (“the respondent”), has been clinically diagnosed as suffering from kleptomania. In the present case, she pleaded guilty in the District Court to two charges of theft under s 380 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) (viz, District Arrest Case No 52403 of 2006 and District Arrest Case No 52404 of...