Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 31 December 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] SGHC(A) 26
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Parties: Foo Diana,Woo Mui Chan

Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan

[2025] SGHC(A) 26

Originating Application No 32 of 2025

Foo Diana

Woo Mui Chan

Appellate Division of the High Court

Debbie Ong Siew Ling JAD and See Kee Oon JAD

Civil Procedure - Further arguments

Hassan Esa Almenoar (R Ramason & Almenoar) for the applicant

The respondent in person.

31 December 2025

Debbie Ong Siew Ling JAD (delivering the judgment of the court):

Introduction

1. This judgment addresses a procedural issue: on what basis should an appellate court allow further arguments from the parties after it has already rendered its decision on an application.

2. On 13 October 2025, we dismissed the applicant’s application in HC/OA 32/2025 (“OA 32”) for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in relation to the decision in HC/S 510/2021 (“S 510”). Two weeks later, the applicant filed a request to make further arguments in respect of that same application, OA 32. The respondent opposed the request. We refuse the applicant’s request for further arguments for the reasons set out below. Essentially, the applicant’s further arguments are aimed at curing deficiencies in her earlier submissions which had been identified in our brief reasons for dismissing OA 32.

Background

3. The applicant is an advocate and solicitor of approximately 20 years standing. She became acquainted with the respondent sometime in 2015, and the two subsequently became friends. Their relationship eventually soured due to disagreements over some loans extended by the applicant to the respondent. Sometime in 2018, the respondent posted an unfavourable online review relating to the applicant on the Google page of The Law Society of Singapore (“LSS”). Later, in 2020, the respondent filed a written complaint to the LSS in respect of the applicant. The applicant sued the respondent in S 510 for defamation in respect of those two statements.

4. Following a trial, on 14 August 2023, a Judge of the General Division of the High Court (“Judge”) found the respondent liable for defaming the applicant in respect of both statements (see Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2023] SGHC 221 at [47] and [71]). A hearing on the assessment of damages then followed, and on 28 March 2025, the Judge awarded the applicant damages in the sum of $41,250 (see Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2025] 4 SLR 95 at [145]). The Judge did not decide the issue of costs then and instead issued directions on submissions on costs and disbursements on the same day. On 2 July 2025, the Judge awarded costs of the entire action (including the assessment of damages) to the applicant, fixed at $25,000 (excluding disbursements) (see Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2025] SGHC 125 at [34]). The Judge also issued directions for the parties to make submissions on disbursements. On 8 August 2025, the Judge fixed the disbursements to be paid by the respondent to the applicant at $5,000, and this order was varied on 12 August 2025 to $6,810.

5. On 18 August 2025, the applicant attempted to file a notice of appeal. This filing was rejected the next day, on the basis that the appeal against the Judge’s decision on damages of 28 March 2025 was not filed within the timeline set out in O 19 r 25 read with O 19 r 4 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”). The applicant was also informed, among other things, that she may apply for an extension of time to appeal that decision.

6. On 20 August 2025, the applicant attempted to file an application in the General Division of the High Court for, among other things, an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in respect of the decisions and orders made by the Judge on 28 March (on the quantum of damages), 2 July (on the quantum of costs) and 12 August 2025 (on the quantum of disbursements). This filing was rejected on 22 August 2025 as the application was made to the incorrect court.

7. Finally, on 1 September 2025, the applicant filed OA 32 in the Appellate Division of the High Court (“Appellate Division”) seeking the following:

• (a) an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in respect of the decisions and orders made by the Judge in S 510 on 28 March (on the quantum of damages), 2 July (on the quantum of costs) and 12 August 2025 (on the quantum of disbursements);

• (b) an order that the notice of appeal be filed within 28 days of the determination of the application; and

• (c) liberty to apply.

8. At the time OA 32 was filed, the applicant was representing herself through her own law practice, Legal Eagles. Subsequently, on 27 October 2025, she appointed her present counsel to represent her. The respondent was and continues to be self-represented.

Parties’ Submissions in OA 32

Applicant’s Submissions

9. The applicant in her written submissions initially appeared to suggest that she was not out of time to appeal. She submitted that O 19 r 4(2)(b) of the ROC 2021 should apply. Order 19 r 4(2)(b) states that in the case of a bifurcated trial, the time for the filing of an appeal in respect of a distinct bifurcated portion of the trial starts to run from the date of the determination in respect of that bifurcated portion. She thus submitted that the time to appeal only started to run from 12 August 2025, when the Judge determined the quantum of disbursements. In this regard, the applicant stated that the “actual total sum of disbursements incurred by [her]” for both the liability and damages tranches, which allegedly amounted to more than $20,000, was a material sum, although she did not explain how this was “material” or how it impacted the analysis.

10. The applicant further stated in her submissions that if O 19 rr 4(2)(a) or 4(2)(b) of the ROC 2021 applied (see [9] above), then the time to appeal started to run from 2 July 2025 instead, which is when the Judge delivered his decision on costs. In this scenario, she submitted that she would have been out of time by 18 days. In the event that O 19 r 4(1A) of the ROC 2021 applied instead, the applicant accepted that she would be out of time by about two and a half months. Order 19 r 4(1A) provides that where the court does not determine the issue of costs within 30 days after it has heard and determined all other matters in the trial, the time for the filing of an appeal starts to run after the expiry of the 30-day period.

11. To support her application for an extension of time, the applicant made submissions primarily on the reasons for the delay and the lack of any prejudice to the respondent. With respect to the former, she contended that she “was just waiting for the … court to conclude all matters” (on the questions of liability, costs and disbursements) and should not be made to start filing the notice of appeal within 30 days of the Judge’s decision on quantum made on 28 March 2025 and be made to file three separate notices of appeal, which would entail “unnecessary and repetitive filing fees” amounting to “great costs”. She argued that she should not be prejudiced if the court had determined the quantum of damages, costs and disbursements on “3 different dates”.

12. On her chances of succeeding on appeal, the applicant merely asserted, without presenting any basis, that she had a good chance of succeeding as “the damages awarded to her of $41,000 is too low”. She did not elaborate on this factor, stating that “[h]er reasons for the prospective appeal will be canvassed at length when leave [to file the notice of appeal] is granted”. She submitted that the threshold to satisfy this factor is low and the court tasked with determining if an extension of time is to be granted “does not scrutinise too closely the merits of the would-be appeal”.

13. Finally, she argued that there was no prejudice to the respondent, especially since there had yet to be any payment by the respondent of the judgment sum owed to the applicant.

Respondent’s Submissions

14. The respondent contended that the applicant’s belief in when the time to appeal started to run was misguided. She submitted that the relevant time started to run from 2 July 2025 when the Judge delivered his decision on costs, and not when the Judge delivered his decision on disbursements. Under the impression that the applicant only filed her application for an extension of time on 27 August 2025, the respondent identified a delay of 25 days, which she regarded as “extremely long and unjustified as the [applicant] is a qualified lawyer herself”.

15. The respondent attributed the delay to the applicant’s misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the law. This reason was, according to the respondent, “unacceptable and shocking” and “totally without any merits” given the applicant’s status as a practising lawyer. The respondent also alleged “grave injustice” and “prejudice” if the application were to be granted, although she did not particularise these assertions.

Our decision in OA 32

16. Having considered the parties’ submissions above and the relevant circumstances, we declined to grant the extension of time sought and dismissed the application in OA 32 on 13 October 2025, setting out our brief reasons in a minute sheet issued to the parties. We reproduce broadly our reasons below.

17. It was first necessary to determine when the time to file the notice of appeal started to run in the present case. Pursuant to O 19 r 4(1) of the ROC 2021, the time for the filing of an appeal does not start to run until after the Judge has heard and determined all matters in the trial, including costs. This is subject to O 19 r 4(1A) of the ROC 2021 which states that where the lower Court does not hear and determine the issue of costs within 30 days after hearing and determining all other matters in the trial, the time for the filing of an appeal starts to run after the expiry of the 30-day period, even if directions for submissions on costs have been issued. In the present case, the time for the filing of an appeal against the decision in S 510 started to run from 27 April...