Fishing Militia, the securitization of fishery and the South China Sea dispute.

AuthorZhang, Hongzhou
PositionReport

With fishery incidents emerging as a major threat to peace and stability in the South China Sea, a better understanding of the underlying causes of these incidents becomes important. Mainstream media, and a substantial body of academic literature, attribute these fishing incidents, and the growing presence of Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea, to China's strategic and political motives, claiming that these fishermen are actually fishing militia. Through revisiting the prevailing fishing militia narrative, this article argues that much wider economic and social factors are at work domestically in China, and that the international and regional scenes are more complex than the picture painted by purely viewing developments with China's fishing militia in isolation. This article also makes the case that fishing disputes in file South China Sea have been heavily securitized with profound implications for the ongoing territorial and jurisdictional disputes in those waters.

Keywords: South China Sea, fishery disputes, fishing militia, securitization.

In April 2016, Foreign Policy published a report entitled "Fishing disputes could spark a South China Sea crisis". This report pointed out that "large and growing fishing fleets in almost all the countries ringing the South China Sea are at the front lines over the fight to control tiny rocks with names like Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross, and Scarborough Shoal". (1) Indeed, amid rising tensions in the South China Sea, there has been a growing number of maritime incidents involving regional fishermen, (2) and with Chinese fishermen in particular. Some of the maritime incidents have even triggered diplomatic and security tensions between China and its neighbours in the South China Sea. For instance, the Philippine Navy's apprehension of eight Chinese fishing vessels at the disputed Scarborough Shoal on 8 April 2012 resulted in a two month-long standoff between Philippine and Chinese vessels. (3) Moreover, a fishing incident off the Natuna Islands on 19 March 2016 led to a serious diplomatic spat between China and Indonesia. (4) In the meantime, China has also begun to take tougher action against fishermen from other countries. According to The China Power project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C., of the forty-five major incidents identified in the South China Sea between 2010 and 2016, at least one China Coast Guard (CCG) (or other Chinese maritime law enforcement) vessel was involved in 71 per cent of incidents, mostly ones involving fishing vessels. (5)

Mainstream media and a substantial body of academic literature attribute these fishing incidents, and the growing presence of Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea, to China's strategic and political motives, arguing that these fishermen are actually fishing militia. (6) They argue that China has been relying heavily on its fishing militia to exercise control over disputed waters. It is claimed that Chinese fishermen have become the main combatants in the country's undeclared and mostly bloodless pseudo-military campaign of expansion into the South China Sea. (7) Not only academic scholars, but security analysts, political and military officials have also made similar arguments. For instance, a senior US State Department official claimed that "China is using its fishing fleets with armed escorts to bolster maritime claims in disputed territory", and "it does point to an expanding presence of Chinese--sort of military and paramilitary forces--and used in a way that is provocative and potentially destabilising". (8)

Against this backdrop, this article seeks to elaborate on previous studies on how best to explain the growing presence of Chinese fishermen in disputed waters, particularly in the South China Sea. While the fishing militia narrative certainly enriches understanding of the fishing disputes in the South China Sea, it suffers from a number of shortcomings. For instance, the fishing militia narrative considers fishermen as passive agents under full control of the Chinese authorities and, more importantly, it fails to situate the growing fishing disputes within the context of the development of regional fishery sectors, particularly that of China. This article makes the case that the fishing disputes in the South China Sea have been heavily securitized. This is partially due to the maritime militia policies of the claimant states. Perhaps more so, it is shaped by language and communication in line with the Copenhagen School of securitization theory. (9) This article also aims to discuss the potential implications of the securitization of the fishery for the management both of the South China Sea disputes and of the sea's fisheries.

Revisiting the Fishing Militia Narrative

Fishing Militia in the South China Sea

All the key South China Sea claimant states view their fishermen as important defenders of their respective claims in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. For China and Vietnam, the fishing militia has always been an important part of these two countries' security forces. With rising tensions in the South China Sea since 2007-8, both China and Vietnam have taken efforts to strengthen their fishing militia forces. In the Chinese context, maritime militia can be considered an armed mass organization that is not divorced from economic activities. It is a reserve force of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The fishing militia is a subset of the maritime militia whose members are recruited from fishing communities. In 2013, during a visit to the Tanmen fishing town of Qionghai in Hainan Province, Chinese President Xi Jinping advised the fishing militia members to "not only lead fishing activities but also collect oceanic information and support the construction of islands and reefs". (10)

Some Chinese scholars and security experts have argued that the fishing militia should be China's first line of defence in disputed waters, particularly in the South China Sea. For example, Lieutenant-General Sheng Bin, chief of the National Defence Mobilization Department of China's Central Military Commission (CMC), in an interview with the Xinhua News Agency said: "We must focus on the building of fishing militias, border and coastal defense militias, emergency response militias and the new reserve forces in order to form a national defense mobilization system which can serve, respond to emergencies and fight during war times." (11)

Over the past few years, several coastal cities in China have established fishing militia forces, and the militia force of China's Sansha City on Hainan Island has grown from a few dozens to several hundred since 2012. (12) In 2013, the Hainan provincial government released a regulatory document entitled "Opinions on Strengthening Maritime Militia Construction" in 2013, (13) and in 2016, provincial authorities passed the 13th Five-Year Plan on Hainan Province's Maritime Militia Construction. (14) Over the past few years, it appears that China has been building a state-owned fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. (15)

Similarly, in November 2009 the Vietnamese National Assembly passed the Law on Militia and Self-Defence Forces with an 89 per cent support rate from the members of the National Assembly. (16) The law included draft provisions for militia and self-defence forces to be compulsory in any enterprise that employed fifty or more workers, and that self-defence militia should escort Vietnamese fishing fleets. It has also been reported that Vietnam has been in search of a model for a fishing militia force. (17) Chinese reports suggest that Vietnam's fishing militia is now quite large, with thirteen fishing militia platoons helping over 3,000 fishermen from Danang operate in the waters of the Paracel Islands. (18) In Khanh Hoa Province, where there are more than 10,000 fishermen and nearly 2,000 fishing boats, the fishing militia organization is much larger: they are equipped with walkie-talkies, infrared night vision binoculars and firearms. (19) Chinese fishermen in Sanya and Tanmen in Hainan, Beihai in Guangxi and other places have reported many times that they were robbed by armed foreign fishing vessels--very likely by Vietnam's fishing militia in the waters around the Spratlys and Beibu Gulf. (20)

In the case of the Philippines, armed fishing vessels have been operating in the disputed waters of the South China Sea for years. Sometimes, pirates poised as fishermen and in other cases, law enforcement officials have been disguised as fishermen. For instance, on 27 April 2006, an armed Philippine fishing vessel attacked a Chinese fishing boat in disputed waters: four Chinese fishermen were killed and three were injured. (21) In 2014, eleven Chinese fishermen were arrested at High Moon Shoal by Philippine law enforcement officials who were disguised as fishermen. (22) The Philippines has also established a newly formed "Area Task Force North" for the South China Sea. The goal is to assert the country's maritime rights in the waters off Bataan and Zambales, as well as around Benham Rise (renamed "Philippine Rise" by the Philippine government in May 2017) in the east. In addition, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and other agencies have been involved in managing maritime disputes. However, it has been reported that Filipino fishermen from Subic and Zambales have not been very supportive of the idea of being deputized to form a maritime militia force in the South China Sea. (23)

The development of the fishing militia in the South China Sea could also be the product of an action-reaction cycle. For example, a Chinese report claimed that China's efforts to strengthen its fishery militia force are being driven partly by Vietnamese actions. (24) Moreover, the Philippines' decision to set up "Area...

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