Eng Foong Ho and Others v Attorney-General

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Tan Lee Meng J
• Judgment Date: 09 May 2008
• Neutral Citation: [2008] SGHC 69
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 79 of 2008
• Date: 09 May 2008
• Published date: 20 May 2008
• Year: 2008
• Plaintiff Counsel: Ang Cheng Hock and Vikram Nair (Allen & Gledhill LLP)
• Citation: [2008] SGHC 69
• Defendant Counsel: Eric Chin and Janice Wong (Attorney-General's Chambers)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Whether acquisition of temple and not nearby mission or church violating equal protection accorded under Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint),Section 5 Land Acquisition Act (Cap 152, 1985 Rev Ed),Equal protection of the law,Article 12 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint),Land,Compulsory acquisitions,Fundamental liberties,Constitutional Law,Freedom of religion,Whether acquisition of temple for public purposes limiting person's right under Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) to profess, practise and propagate his religion

9 May 2008

Tan Lee Meng J:

1 The plaintiffs, Ms Eng Foong Ho, Mr Hue Guan Koon and Ms Ang Beng Woon, are devotees of the Jin Long Si Temple, which is located at No 61 Lorong A-Leng, Singapore 536751 (“the temple property”). They sought a declaration that the acquisition of the temple property by the Collector of Land Revenue (“the Collector”) violated Article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (“the Constitution”), which provides that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law. I dismissed their application and now give the reasons for my decision.

Background

2 The temple property is subject to a trust for religious purposes created in 1941. The trustees, Mr Soon Joo Ee, Mr Tan Tion Beng and Mr Tan Poh Heong, who are the legal owners of the temple property, are not parties to this action.

3 The temple property is located near the new Bartley MRT station, which is along the Circle Line. Adjacent to the temple property is the Ramakrishna Mission (“the mission”), and next to the mission stands the Bartley Christian Church (“the church”).

4 In a letter dated 20 January 2003, the Collector informed the trustees of the temple property as follows:

Today, Government announced the implementation of Stage 3 of the Circle Line (CCL) that will extend the CCL from Upper Paya Lebar Road/Bartley Road to Marymount Road. Details of the land acquired were gazetted today.

2 Your property is affected by the acquisition. Notice in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act is attached.

5 The Gazette notification in relation to the acquisition of the temple property and another nearby property, a residential development (Strata Title Plan No 1278), was published on 20 January 2003. The Gazette notification stated that the two properties were acquired for the “construction of Circle Line stage 3 & comprehensive redevelopment.”

6 The temple’s trustees, who noted that the land occupied by the mission and the church had not been acquired by the Collector, appealed against the acquisition of their property. In a letter dated 23 January 2003 to Mr R Ravindran, the Member of Parliament for Braddell Heights GC, Mr Tan Poh Heong, one of the trustees, stated as follows:

[W]e cannot understand the following:

(A) Why our temple land is the only piece of land being singled out for acquisition among the under-mentioned religious organisation[s] around our neighbourhood vicinity

1 Upper Paya Lebar Chinese Methodist Church

2 Bethany Independent Presbyterian Church

3 Bartley Christian Church

4 Ramakrishna Mission Temple.

(B) Why a Chinese Temple with a history of more than 60 years is picked to be acquired from a group of religious bodies that are much ‘younger’ in age.

(C) Along Lorong How Sun, there are rows of Bungalows, semi-detached & terrace houses are left untouched; whereas only our temple land is subject to acquisition; hence it becomes very questionable.

7 Numerous appeals against the acquisition of the temple property were made to the Prime Minister, Ministers and Members of Parliament. On 26 April 2004, Mr R Ravindran appealed to the Prime Minister to look into the matter. On 21 July 2004, the Singapore Land Authority (“SLA”) replied as follows:

1 We refer to the appeal by Mr R Ravindran … on your behalf to the Prime Minister, dated 26 April 2004.

2 [T]he Government does not distinguish between the religious groups or types of development in deciding which parcels of land to acquire. The acquisition of the temple was made after careful study and consideration.

3 Unlike the other cases cited by you in your appeal, Jin Long Si Temple is zoned Residential use in the Master Plan. The acquisition of the site will allow better optimization of land use as it can be amalgamated with the adjoining State land for comprehensive redevelopment. This is part of our continuous effort to optimise land use in land-scarce Singapore. We therefore regret that we are unable to accede to your request not to acquire the land.

8 Although the temple property was gazetted for acquisition on 20 January 2003, the temple trustees were given up to 31 January 2008 to hand over the said property to the Collector. As the date for the handover of the property to the authorities neared, the temple trustees appealed again to the Prime Minister on 23 May 2007 to intervene in the matter. On 20 June 2007, the Permanent Secretary for Law and the Permanent Secretary for National Development jointly replied to the temple trustees as follows:

We have studied your appeal and noted that the grounds for retention of Jing Long Si Temple put forth in this appeal have already been addressed previously. We regret to inform that we are not able to accede to the request to retain the temple by rescinding the acquisition.

To reiterate, the Government does not distinguish among the religious groups or types of development in deciding which parcels of land to acquire. The acquisition of the temple, made after careful study and evaluation, was to allow better optimization of land use by amalgamating with the adjoining State land for comprehensive redevelopment.

9 On 16 January 2008, the plaintiffs filed the present originating summons for a declaration that the acquisition of the temple property violated Article 12 of the Constitution.

Whether the plaintiffs have locus standi

10 The first hurdle standing in the way of the plaintiffs relates to locus standi. What standing do the plaintiffs, who are merely temple devotees, have in the acquisition of the temple property when its legal owners, the trustees, are not parties to the action and have not come to court for any relief against the acquisition order?

11 The plaintiffs, who claim to have a strong emotional attachment to the temple, assert that they have a “legitimate interest” in the matter. However, in Karaha Bodas Co LLC v Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd [2006] 1 SLR 112, the Court of Appeal stated at [15] as follows:

As far as an action for a declaration is concerned, the requirement that the plaintiff must have the locus standi required to bring the action is the equivalent of requiring a plaintiff in an action for substantive relief to have a cause of action. This is because in order to have the necessary standing, the plaintiff must be asserting the recognition of a “right” that is personal to him.

[emphasis added]

12 The Court of Appeal approved of the following passage from Lord Diplock’s judgment in Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435, at 501:

The only kinds of rights with which courts of justice are concerned are legal rights; and a court of civil jurisdiction is concerned with legal rights only when the aid of the court is invoked by one party claiming a right against another party, to protect or enforce the right or to provide a remedy against that other party for infringement of it, or is invoked by either party to settle a dispute between them as to the existence or nature of the right claimed. So for the court to have jurisdiction to declare any legal right, it must be one which is claimed by one of the parties as enforceable against an adverse party to the litigation, either as a subsisting right or as one which may come into existence in the future conditionally on the happening of an event.

13 The plaintiffs contended that they had a right to commence the present action on the ground that where an individual’s constitutional rights are affected, he or she has a sufficient interest to ensure that his or her rights are protected. They relied on Chan Hiang Leng Colin & Ors v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR 609, where the Court of Appeal reiterated that the sufficiency of the applicant’s interest is judged in relation to the subject matter of the application and added as follows at 614:

In the present case, what is complained of is an alleged violation of a citizen’s constitutional right under art 15 of the Constitution to profess, practise and propagate his religion. Such rights are constitutionally enshrined. If a constitutional guarantee is to mean anything, it must mean that any citizen can complain to the courts if there is a violation of it. The fact that the violation would also affect every other citizen should not detract from a citizen’s interest in seeing that his constitutional rights are not violated.

14 While the courts must vigorously uphold a citizen’s right to religious freedom, the short answer to the plaintiffs’ line of argument is that by acquiring a temple, church or mosque for public purposes, the government is not limiting any person’s right under the Constitution to profess, practise and propagate his religion.

15 In truth, this is a land...