Deciphering the shift in America's South China Sea policy.

AuthorNguyen, Phuong
PositionReport

The tensions resulting from the territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes between China and five Southeast Asian countries--Brunei, Indonesia, (1) Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam--have for years dominated the headlines on the South China Sea and defined the lens through which the issue is seen. While the United States has at times expressed its concerns over incidents in which destabilizing actions occurred, these developments had minimal impact on the US grand strategy of preventing the rise of a potential hegemon in the Western Pacific. Prior to China's push to enlarge the features it occupies in the Spratly Islands, US officials largely viewed the sovereignty dispute as a matter to be resolved between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and were careful in framing the issue as a diplomatic rather than a military challenge. While Washington had always emphasized its commitment to, and the need for all sides to respect, freedom of navigation and overflight and the unimpeded flow of global commerce, it has never enunciated in unequivocal terms what the United States would do to uphold these principles. This position would change as a result of US assessments of the implications of China's artificial island building beginning in late 2013.

The United States is not a party to the South China Sea dispute. Yet it is a party to a disagreement and contest with a rising China on the meaning of freedom of the seas--a principle that is central to US core interests--and what the regional security landscape of the Asia-Pacific ought to look like in future years. Understanding the crux of this contest is important for grasping the role that the South China Sea plays in US grand strategy, and factors that can lead to substantive changes in US policy on the issue, or lack thereof.

This article begins by deciphering what the United States views as its core interests in the South China Sea that have the potential to either support or upend US grand strategy. It posits that the United States has two fundamental and enduring core interests in the South China Sea: defending its view on freedom of the seas, and maintaining the naval and air superiority of the United States in the Western Pacific. The article moves on to offer an overview of America's South China Sea policy in the context of the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, and is based on the premise that US officials began to devote significantly more attention and resources to the issue as a result of greater US focus on regional issues, especially with regard to Southeast Asia. This section also sheds light on the evolving nature of the disagreement between Beijing and Washington in light of the US rebalance. It presents a context for understanding how China's artificial island building, if strategically deployed, can be a nexus between these two sets of disputes, with the effect of causing the fundamental disagreement between the United States and China to spill over into the South China Sea. The following section elaborates official US views on China's reclamation activities and its implications for US core interests and grand strategy in the Asia Pacific. It seeks to capture the shift in US strategy on the South China Sea. This article concludes that the United States has responded with a new, active strategy that aims to: first, deter China from taking further actions at its reclaimed features that would alter the existing military balance of power in the region; and second, make it pay a "net effect" for its behaviour--should it continue to pursue an aggressive course of action--by engaging more forcibly with Southeast Asian partners. The final section outlines how the new shift in US policy has manifested itself to date, and analyzes the extent of its effectiveness as of this writing towards China's actions and for US core interests. This article seeks to capture a US-centric view of the evolving nature of the South China Sea dispute in relation to its grand strategy. Hence the author relies primarily on US government documents, statements, and analyses, and publicly available records of US government meetings for the research and writing of this article.

The South China Sea in US Grand Strategy

The rise of China as a major world power has led to questions central to US grand strategy in the twenty-first century, most importantly what kind of international actor China will be as it continues to rise and what this means for the current international order which is characterized by US primacy. US policymakers are acutely aware that a new international security environment is taking shape, and that the unipolar moment of the last twenty-five years during which the United States enjoyed the status of the sole superpower has essentially ended. This recognition carries substantial implications for the key element in US grand strategy of "preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another", one that could concentrate enough power to undermine what the United States perceives to be its core interests. (2)

Freedom of the Seas

The most fundamental and enduring US interest in the South China Sea has to do with freedom of the seas. US officials and analysts have long considered it a defining feature of the existing US-led international order. The economic importance of the South China Sea is undeniable: it is estimated that nearly 30 per cent of global maritime trade passes through the South China Sea every year, including approximately US$1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound for the United States. (3) Yet the US view of freedom of the seas goes beyond the freedom for commercial ships to pass through international waterways. The United States uses "freedom of the seas" to describe "the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace, including for military ships and aircraft, recognized under international law", including within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of other countries--the idea of a mare liberum it says dates back hundreds of years. (4) The ability to keep sea lanes open for unimpeded global commerce is fundamental not only for the US economy, but also for the ability of its military forces to defend US interests overseas, respond to international crises, and, given its geography, influence events beyond its shores.

China, meanwhile, has a different interpretation of what "freedom of the seas" constitutes. It has repeatedly made clear its view that international law, in this case the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), does not grant a state access to the 200-nautical-mile (nm) EEZ of a coastal state either for economic or military activities. (5) Based on this view, China has a right to regulate all activities--military and economic--that fall within its EEZ, including by the United States.

The dispute between China and the United States on foreign military activities within EEZs is not new. It is at the heart of multiple incidents at sea between US and Chinese ships and aircraft between 2001 and 2016. As China continues to rise and flex its military muscles, including in the East and South China Seas, this disagreement is poised to become a greater driving force of US and Chinese actions in the disputed South China Sea, where China possesses a clear and ever growing military advantage over its smaller neighbours. The most well-known incident of Chinese intercept of US operations took place in April 2001, when a Chinese fighter jet collided mid-air with a US Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft flying about 65 miles (105 kilometres) southeast of China's Hainan Island, forcing the US plane to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island. Similar incidents involving US and Chinese military assets in the South China Sea happened again in 2002, 2009, 2013, 2014, and 2016, according to records made public by the US government. In August 2014, for example, a Chinese J-ll fighter jet intercepted a US P-8 maritime patrol aircraft that was flying about 135 miles (217 kilometres) east of Hainan Island, an intercept Washington called "very, very close, very dangerous". (6)

The United States is not a claimant in the dispute between China and five Southeast Asian countries--Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam--and has said it does not take a position on sovereignty issues in the South China Sea. However, ultimately it does not want China to have the freedom to claim EEZs from islands it controls in the South China Sea, and more vehemently enforce its concept of freedom of the seas from these islands in the future. Following the 12 July 2016 ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague on a case brought by the Philippines against China in 2013--which ruled all features in the Spratly Islands unworthy of maritime entitlements enjoyed by natural islands as provided under UNCLOS--the areas of interest in the US-China EEZ dispute can be legally narrowed to Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands, (7) the latter controlled by China but also claimed by Vietnam (and Taiwan). China, however, neither participated in nor recognized the ruling.

According to a 2016 report to the US Congress:

Press reports of maritime disputes in the SCS [South China Sea] and ECS [East China Sea] often focus on territorial disputes while devoting little or no attention to the EEZ dispute. From the US perspective, however, the EEZ dispute is arguably as significant as the maritime territorial disputes because of the EEZ dispute's proven history of leading to US-Chinese incidents at sea and because of its potential for affecting US military operations not only in the SCS and ECS, but around the world. (8) Consequently, the report raises strategic implications that the outcome of the ongoing US-China dispute on EEZs could have on US military strategy and global foreign policy goals. Should China's view gain ground or proceed unchallenged, the reach and effectiveness of...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT