Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore v CNL Logistic Solutions Pte Ltd and another

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Judgment Date: 30 June 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] SGHC 139
• Parties: Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore,CNL Logistic Solutions Pte Ltd,Gilmon Transportation & Warehousing Pte Ltd

Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore v CNL Logistic Solutions Pte Ltd and another

[2026] SGHC 139

Tribunal Appeal No 9 of 2025

Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore

CNL Logistic Solutions Pte Ltd

Gilmon Transportation & Warehousing Pte Ltd

General Division of the High Court

Philip Jeyaretnam J

Competition Law - Anti-competitive agreements - Nature of a “by object” restriction of competition

Competition Law - Anti-competitive agreements - Role of “economic context” in determining a “by object” restriction of competition

Competition Law - Competition Appeal Board - Nature of an appeal from the Competition Appeal Board to the High Court

Tan Cheng Han SC (instructed), Loke Shiu Meng, Cindy Chang, Tham Chang Xian, Tan Jie Lin, Clara Ying, and Melina Chew (Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore) for the appellant

Ronald Wong Jian Jie (Huang Jianjie), Stuart Andrew Peter, Tan Jia Jun James (Covenant Chambers LLC) for the respondents.

30 June 2026

Judgment reserved.

Philip Jeyaretnam J:

Introduction

1. The “by object” restriction in competition law is commonly understood as a restriction on conduct considered so inherently harmful to competition that the competition authority need not consider the effects of the conduct before concluding that the conduct was anti-competitive. In this matter, warehousers operating in the same complex discussed price increases implemented by the largest operator in that complex. It is undisputed that the warehousers who are parties to this case have a relatively small market share and low market power.

2. Whether this discussion between the warehousers can be, and should be, deemed a “by object” restriction of competition depends on when and how the “by object” restriction applies, and more specifically, the extent to which a competition authority must examine the economic context within which the alleged infringement occurred, before it can conclude that the conduct was, by its very nature, anti-competitive.

3. This is the first occasion on which the High Court has been called upon to consider an appeal under the Competition Act 2004 (“Competition Act”). The appeal arises from a finding by the Competition Appeal Board (“CAB”) that the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) had not proved that an exchange of pricing information between a group of warehouse operators amounted to a restriction of competition “by object” under s 34 of the Competition Act. The CCS now challenges that finding as wrong in law. For the reasons which I set out below, I agree with the CCS, and allow the appeal.

Roles and jurisdiction

4. Before turning to the facts and the issues, I set out the structure and respective roles of the three bodies whose decisions are engaged in this appeal: the CCS, the CAB, and this court. Understanding the roles and powers of these bodies and their respective limits within the broader landscape of competition law in Singapore is helpful to appreciate how the questions arising on appeal must be resolved.

5. The CCS is a statutory body established under the Competition Act to administer and enforce three key prohibitions in competition law: “Agreements, etc., preventing, restricting or distorting competition” under s 34 of the Competition Act; “Abuse of dominant position” under s 47 of the Competition Act; and “Mergers” which have resulted or may be expected to result in a substantially lessening of competition under s 54 of the Competition Act. In particular and relevant to this appeal, the prohibition under s 34 is further understood to fall into two broad categories: where the agreement, decision by associations or concerted practice has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within Singapore (ie, “by object” limb), and where the agreement, decision by associations or concerted practice has as its effect the same (ie, “by effect” limb).

6. Vested with both investigative and adjudicative powers, the CCS may conduct investigations into suspected infringements under s 62 of the Competition Act. Upon completing such investigations, it may, under s 68 of the Competition Act, issue decisions finding infringements, direct infringing parties to cease the offending conduct, and impose financial penalties of up to 10% of the infringing undertaking’s turnover in Singapore for each year of infringement, for a maximum of three years, amongst other powers.

7. The CCS thus combines the roles of fact-finder, prosecutor, and first-instance decision-maker. As a counterbalance, the Competition Act provides for an independent appellate body in the CAB. The CAB is a specialist tribunal established under Part 4 of the Competition Act and constituted by persons appointed “on the basis of their ability and experience in industry, commerce or administration, or their professional qualifications or their suitability otherwise for appointment”: s 72(1) of the Competition Act. It has the power to conduct a full merits review. Under s 73(8) of the Competition Act, it may confirm or set aside the decision which is the subject of appeal. It also has the powers to find facts as it is endowed with the power to “give such direction, or take such other step, as the [CCS] could itself have given or taken” (s 73(8)(c) of the Competition Act), and “make any other decision which the [CCS] could itself have made” (s 73(8)(d) of the Competition Act). The CAB may therefore re-examine the evidence to reach its own factual conclusions and form its own view as to the economic analysis.

8. Under s 74 of the Competition Act, a further appeal lies from the CAB to the General Division of the High Court, and thereafter to the Court of Appeal under s 74(4). This appeal is only on points of law or the quantum of a financial penalty: s 74(1) of the Competition Act. This court’s jurisdiction accordingly does not extend to re-examining the CAB’s findings of fact or its economic assessments, but is confined to ensuring that CAB acted lawfully within the correct legal boundaries. Where the CAB has done so, its conclusions are not open to challenge in this court merely because this court might have weighed the evidence differently.

Background facts

9. I set out the background facts to this appeal, as found by the CCS and to the extent accepted by the CAB. As I noted in the preceding paragraph, this court is limited to deciding on appeals on points of law, and has no power to review the CAB’s findings of fact.

10. The first respondent, CNL Logistics Solutions Pte Ltd (“CNL”) and second respondent, Gilmon Transportation & Warehousing Pte Ltd (“Gilmon”), provide warehousing services at Keppel Distripark, a multi-tenanted cargo distribution complex in Singapore.¹ As warehouse operators, they provide storage and cargo handling services, including receiving shipments, temporary storage, unpacking of consolidated cargo, and arranging onward delivery to consignees.²

11. Keppel Distripark is a free trade zone.³ Duties and Goods and Services Tax are not levied on cargo stored within it – they fall due only when goods are brought out for local sale or consumption, or consumed within the zone itself.⁴ At the material time, approximately 26 warehouse operators operated at Keppel Distripark.⁵

12. On 15 June 2017 at approximately 4.41pm, Hup Soon Cheong Pte Ltd (“HSC”), the largest warehouse operator within Keppel Distripark, notified a customer that it would be imposing a new levy on import cargo stored within the free trade zone (“FTZ Surcharge”).⁶ It posted the same notice at its warehouse office shortly thereafter.⁷ HSC was the first warehouse operator to announce the FTZ Surcharge.⁸ HSC’s sister company, Capital Logistics Services Pte Ltd (“CLS”), which was also one of the larger operators at Keppel Distripark, followed suit the same day.⁹

13. Other warehouse operators followed in short order.¹⁰ Among them were the respondents and two additional operators, Penanshin (PSA KD) Pte Ltd (“Penanshin”) and Mac-Nels (KD) Terminal Pte Ltd (“Mac-Nels”) (collectively, the “Undertakings”).¹¹ The Undertakings held approximately 16.09% of the warehouse operator market at Keppel Distripark,¹² with the respondents accounting for approximately 5.75% of that market.¹³

Decision below

The CCS’s infringement decision

14. On 17 November 2022, the CCS issued its Infringement Decision (“ID”) against the Undertakings. The CCS’s case proceeded on two alternative bases.

15. The CCS’s primary case was that a meeting took place at around 11.30am on 15 June 2017 between representatives of the respondents and Penanshin (“15 June 2017 Meeting”).¹⁴ The CCS found on a balance of probabilities that at that meeting, CNL’s Director and General Manager, Vasu s/o Achutan (“Mr Vasu”) and Gilmon’s Managing Director, Teo Siang Siak (“Mr Teo”), met with Penanshin’s Container Freight Station Manager, Mohamed Yasrin bin Mohamed Yasil (“Mr Yasrin”).¹⁵ The CCS found that Mr Vasu and Mr Teo told Mr Yasrin that certain warehouse operators, including the respondents, intended to adopt the FTZ Surcharge, and invited Penanshin to do likewise.¹⁶ They also asked Mr Yasrin to ask if Mac-Nels would join in on adopting the FTZ Surcharge.¹⁷

16. Alternatively, the CCS found that even if the 15 June 2017 Meeting did not take place, there had been an exchange of commercially sensitive pricing information between the Undertakings prior to their implementation of the FTZ Surcharge.¹⁸ The CCS identified the following communications as establishing this (“Communications”):

• (a) At 7.47pm on 15 June 2017, Thomas Chua, Gilmon’s Assistant General Manager (“Mr Chua”), told Mr Yasrin that Gilmon intended to impose the FTZ Surcharge. He then forwarded to Mr Yasrin, via WhatsApp, the FTZ Surcharge notices that HSC and CLS had issued.¹⁹

• (b) Mr Vasu called Mr Yasrin and asked him whether Penanshin was going to impose the FTZ Surcharge.²⁰

• (c) At 9.57pm on 15...