Chua Tian Bok Timothy v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Yong Pung How CJ
• Judgment Date: 16 September 2004
• Neutral Citation: [2004] SGHC 208
• Docket Number: Criminal Revision No 19 of 2004
• Date: 16 September 2004
• Year: 2004
• Published date: 17 September 2004
• Plaintiff Counsel: Subhas Anandan and Anand Nalachandran (Harry Elias Partnership)
• Citation: [2004] SGHC 208
• Defendant Counsel: Benjamin Yim Geok Choon (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Considerations of public interest,Compounding of offences,Voluntarily causing hurt in road rage incident,Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Section 199 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed), s 323 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed),Whether judge's discretion to refuse composition correctly exercised,Victim consenting to composition after seeking independent legal advice

16 September 2004

Yong Pung How CJ:

1 This was a petition for the revision of a magistrate’s decision in withholding his consent to the composition of an offence under s 323 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed).

The facts

2 The petitioner, Timothy Chua Tian Bok, was charged under s 323 of the Penal Code with voluntarily causing hurt to one Toh Tong Lee (“the victim”) by punching him in the face. This incident occurred after a road accident where the petitioner had come out of his car and assaulted the victim. The petitioner was a passenger in the car. As a consequence of the alleged assault, the victim suffered three sets of injuries – a bruise on the right cheek, a superficial scratch below the bruise near the right side of the mouth and multiple elongated bruises on the left and right aspects of the front neck.

3 An offence under s 323 of the Penal Code is compoundable under s 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the CPC”).

4 Section 199(1) of the CPC states:

The offences punishable under the Penal Code shown in the sixth column of Schedule A as being compoundable may be compounded by the person mentioned in that column provided that when an arrest has been effected or an application has been made for the issue of a warrant of arrest or summons the consent of a Magistrate or, if the offence is not triable by a Magistrate’s Court, of a District Judge, shall first be obtained.

5 The victim agreed to accept an ex gratia payment of $7,500 from the petitioner and confirmed his decision through independent counsel. The petitioner thereby applied for composition pursuant to s 199 of the CPC.

6 Magistrate Gilbert Low exercised his discretion to withhold consent to the composition because he felt that to do otherwise would be tantamount to diluting the court’s strict policy against road rage incidents and allowing a person in the petitioner’s position to buy himself out of his predicament. The magistrate observed that this strict policy had been extended to passengers of motor vehicles who resorted to violence against other road users, as well as first-time offenders. He also noted that, as a result of the alleged assault, the victim sustained multiple injuries.

Whether the magistrate exercised his discretion correctly

7 The main issue I had to decide was whether the magistrate erred in withholding his consent to the composition. It is undisputed that an offence under s 323 of the Penal Code is compoundable under s 199 of the CPC. As to the discretion of a judge to grant or withhold consent to composition, I have expressed my view in PP v Norzian bin Bintat [1995] 3 SLR 462 at 474, [52]:

[T]hat discretion is a judicial discretion and therefore one which must be exercised not only in accordance with the rules of reason and justice but also in accordance with the provisions of the law.

8 Further, in two of my recent decisions in Kee Leong Bee v PP [1999] 3 SLR 190 at [21] and Ho Yean Theng Jill v PP [2004] 1 SLR 254 at [40], I have said that:

Where an order involves a discretion of the court, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of the discretion unless it was exercised on demonstrably wrong principles or without any grounds, or if the judge had ignored some relevant provision of law ...

9 There are several general guidelines laid down in both foreign and local case law that may assist the court in the exercise of its discretion. I discussed these principles at length in Norzian bin Bintat (at 474–475, [54] and [56]):

[I]n a case where the public interest is involved, it is proper to withhold consent to composition. …

[I]n the absence of aggravating factors, the courts should lean towards the granting of consent in cases where the public interest does not figure strongly.

10 Also, in exercising this discretion, the court should take into account factors including the interests of the parties, relationship between the parties, possibility of the parties living in peace and harmony if composition is allowed, the stage at which composition is sought, circumstances under which the offence is alleged to have been committed and the nature of the alleged offence.

11 After considering the written and oral submissions of the petitioner and the Prosecution, I was of the view that the magistrate exercised his discretion correctly in withholding his consent to composition. I now give my reasons.

12 I found that the magistrate did not err when he withheld his consent to compound the offence because he was conscious of the strong public interest against allowing composition in road rage incidents. Our courts have consistently emphasised the seriousness of such incidents of assault on motorists on the roads and have always adopted a strict policy against such incidents, often imposing a custodial sentence where the offence is voluntarily causing hurt under s 323 of the Penal Code and caning where the offence is the more serious one of voluntarily causing grievous hurt under s 325 of the Penal Code (Ong Hwee Leong v PP [1992] 1 SLR 794; PP v Lee Seck Hing [1992] 2 SLR 745). I made it clear in Ong Hwee Leong v PP and PP v Lee Seck Hing that there can be no place on our roads for road bullies. In Ong Hwee Leong v PP, I observed at 795–796, [7] that:

Such minor incidents occur on our roads many times every day. No doubt they are frustrating to those involved. But if, many times every day on our public roads, everyone were to lose his temper and react to the degree the appellant did, all semblance of order would quickly dissipate and only the most violent would prevail. The perceptible trend in this direction deservedly incurs the courts’ displeasure and must be...