Chiong Chin May Selena v Attorney-General and another

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Sundaresh Menon CJ
• Judgment Date: 30 June 2021
• Neutral Citation: [2021] SGHC 167
• Published date: 06 July 2021
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 1 of 2021
• Year: 2021
• Hearing Date: 30 June 2021
• Plaintiff Counsel: The applicant in person
• Defendant Counsel: Jeyendran s/o Jeyapal and Enoch Wong Lok Hang (Attorney-General's Chambers),Rajan Sanjiv Kumar and Mehaerun Simaa d/o Ravichanran (Allen & Gledhill LLP)
• Citation: [2021] SGHC 167
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Legal Profession,Section 102 Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed,Whether applicant fully rehabilitated,Reinstatement,Interest of the public

Sundaresh Menon CJ (delivering the judgment of the court ex tempore):

This is the application of Selena Chiong Chin May, who we refer to as “the applicant”, seeking reinstatement to the roll of advocates and solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore (“the Roll”) pursuant to s 102 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed). The applicant was struck off the Roll on 20 August 2014, following her conviction on several counts of criminal breach of trust (“CBT”). The application is opposed by the Attorney-General and by the Law Society of Singapore (“Law Society”).

Having considered the parties’ argument and the evidence, we dismiss the application. In our judgment, the applicant has not discharged the burden of demonstrating that she has been fully rehabilitated.

Background facts

We briefly recount the background facts. The applicant was struck off the Roll in 2014 following her convictions on several counts of CBT. The applicant had faced two sets of disciplinary proceedings prior to being struck off. A common theme running across the applicant’s various disciplinary issues was her mental illness. After the birth of her first child in 1996, she was diagnosed, first with depression, then later with bipolar disorder.¹

In 2013, she was convicted of several counts of CBT. She had retained client monies instead of placing the sums in question in the client account as she was required to. She was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment. She appealed against both the conviction and sentence. In March 2014, the High Court dismissed the appeal on conviction, but allowed the appeal on sentence and reduced the sentence to a day’s imprisonment and some fines. The High Court was sympathetic to the applicant’s mental condition, finding that she “had a long history of Bipolar Disorder which could have affected her judgment adversely”.²

In March 2014, after the appeal was disposed of, disciplinary proceedings ensued. We struck the applicant’s name off the Roll because the CBT offences involved an element of dishonesty. However, we also took note of the applicant’s mental illness as follows:³

… [the applicant’s] acts are to be seen through the prism of her mental illness. While we accept that [the High Court] on appeal was sufficiently moved by her condition to substantially reduce her sentence, it is also a fact that [the High Court] affirmed the conviction. … It seems to us that [the applicant] needs help and attention of professionals to help resolve her mental issues. When that is done and we are satisfied that her issues are behind her … it may well be that we would view sympathetically an application for reinstatement that is brought much earlier than is customarily the case.

In January 2021, the applicant made this application for reinstatement on the Roll.

Our decision

The law is settled that three crucial factors must be considered when assessing an application for reinstatement (see Nathan Edmund v Law Society of Singapore [2013] 1 SLR 729 at [10]): Whether an adequate period of time has passed between the striking off order and the reinstatement application (we refer to this as the “interval”); Whether the applicant has been fully and completely rehabilitated; and Whether allowing the application would undermine or prejudice the protection of the public interest and the reputation of the legal profession. We briefly consider each of these factors.

Adequacy of time

A period of almost seven years has passed since the date on which the applicant was struck off (namely 20 August 2014). As a general rule, a period that is significantly longer than five years should have passed before an application for reinstatement will be considered favourably: Knight Glenn Jeyasingam v Law Society of Singapore [2007] 3 SLR(R) 704 (“Knight Glenn”) at [15]. In that context, a passage of time of seven years may not typically be regarded as sufficient. However, both the Attorney-General and the Law Society do not take issue with the adequacy of the interval in this case. In the particular circumstances before us, we agree for two reasons.

First, at the time of the striking off order, we had noted that the CBT offences were committed by the applicant at a time when she was suffering from a psychiatric illness which reduced her culpability (see [] above). As a result, we had observed that we might view “sympathetically” an application for reinstatement that was brought somewhat earlier than would customarily have been expected to be the case.

Second, the applicant had voluntarily ceased practice in July 2010, some four years before the striking off order. By way of background, in July 2010, police reports were made against the applicant which eventually culminated in criminal proceedings being brought against her. At the request of the Law Society, the applicant had then agreed to surrender her Practicing Certificate (“PC”). In this light, the effective period during which the applicant has not been practising is in fact 11 years.

We make some brief observations on the relevance of a voluntary suspension in such circumstances. As a matter of principle, this can be considered as a mitigating factor or as a factor that weighs on the adequacy of the interval, if and to the extent the court is satisfied that it demonstrates genuine remorse and contrition on the part of the errant lawyer (Knight Glenn at [16]–[17]). Furthermore, there is a public interest in suitable cases to incentivise a solicitor who may be facing disciplinary proceedings to cease practice voluntarily in advance of the formal determination by the relevant disciplinary bodies (Law Society of Singapore v Chia Choon Yang [2018] 5 SLR 1068 (“Chia Choon Yang”) at [52]). However, it is a matter for the court’s discretion as to just how this...