Chia Choo Ling and another v Phua Chiew Pheng and another
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Tan May Tee |
Judgment Date | 30 June 2010 |
Neutral Citation | [2010] SGDC 279 |
Court | District Court (Singapore) |
Hearing Date | 18 November 2009,19 November 2009,23 November 2009,07 October 2009 |
Docket Number | DC 3240 of 2007, District Court Appeal No. 25 of 2010 |
Plaintiff Counsel | Dennis Loh (Chiu Cheong & Co) |
Defendant Counsel | Lew Meow Fah (Lew Meow Fah & Co) |
Published date | 21 February 2011 |
The subject matter of this action is a Housing and Development Board flat at Block 27 Lim Liak Street #04-38 Singapore 160027 (hereinafter “the Flat”) situated in the Tiong Bahru estate. The Plaintiffs are a married couple who wanted to buy the Flat. The Defendants are the owners, the 1st Defendant being the daughter of the 2nd Defendant. The Defendants granted an option to the Plaintiffs to purchase the Flat at the price of $350,000 (hereinafter “the Option”).
Neither party was represented by a property agent to transact the intended sale and purchase of the Flat. 2 days before the expiry of the Option, the Plaintiffs could not contact the 1st Defendant. In a state of panic, they consulted solicitors the next day. The solicitors attempted to exercise the Option by delivering a copy of the Option to the Flat and also sending it by post. This method of exercising the Option was not in accordance with the strict terms of the Option.
The Plaintiffs claim that the Option had nonetheless been exercised resulting in a valid contract for the sale and purchase of the Flat. The Defendants’ position was that the Option had not been exercised in accordance with its terms and accordingly, no contract was reached.
The trial was on the issue of liability only. At the conclusion of the proceedings, I decided in favour of the Defendants. The Plaintiffs’ claim was accordingly dismissed with costs. The Plaintiffs have now appealed to the High Court and I set out herein the reasons for my decision.
Pleadings The material facts as pleaded in the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim are as follows:
In essence, the Plaintiffs’ case was premised on the Option having been duly exercised by LawHub’s representative delivering a copy of the Option rather than the original together with a cheque and a covering letter to the Flat and which were received and acknowledged by a tenant at the premises on 21 June 2007. The exercise of the Option meant that the Defendants were bound to sell the Flat to them and the Defendants’ failure thereafter to apply to HDB amounted to a breach of the agreement to sell the Flat for which the Plaintiffs were entitled to damages.
The Defence, as amended, was a rather lengthy pleading running into a total of 32 paragraphs. In summary, while the Defendants admitted that they had granted the Option which was valid up to 4.00 pm of 22 June 2007, they pleaded firstly, that the manner by which the Option was to be exercised was not in accordance with Clause 5 of the Option. Clause 5 prescribed that a buyer must do the following to exercise the Option:
It was the Defendants’ contention that the Plaintiffs had failed to exercise the Option pursuant to the manner stated in Clause 5 of the Option as the Plaintiffs had failed to deliver the signed Option (original copy) and the payment of the Option Exercise Fee of $4,000.00 to the Defendants. This was in fact admitted by the Plaintiffs as LawHub had sent to the Defendants only a
The Defendants denied the allegation that they had failed, refused or neglected to respond to the Plaintiffs’ telephone calls and messages. The 1st Defendant had been ill on 20 and 21 June 2007 but on 22 June 2007 she had contacted the 1st Plaintiff in the morning. He was however reluctant to speak with her on the purported exercise of the Option. The Defendants further denied that LawHub’s representative had hand-delivered the copy of the Option together with the cheque for $4,000.00 to the premises. What the Defendants received were copies of the letter dated 21 June 2007 from LawHub together with a photocopy of the signed Option and a photocopy of the cheque for $4,000.00 sent by ordinary post and Certificate of Posting to the Defendants’ premises.
As the Plaintiffs had failed to exercise the Option in the manner provided in the Option, there was no legally binding agreement between the parties for the purchase of the Flat. Pursuant to Clause 11 of the Option, a joint application for approval was to be made to HDB by both seller and buyer after the exercise of the Option. Accordingly, the Defendants were entitled to cancel the application made unilaterally by the Plaintiffs. The Defendants had no knowledge of the loss and damages alleged to have been suffered by the Plaintiffs and denied liability for the same.
The Defendants further relied on Clause 4 of the Option stipulating that upon its expiry, the Option became null and void. Also, pursuant to Clause 6 of the Option, the Defendants were entitled to retain the Option fee of $1,000.00 if the Plaintiffs did not exercise the Option in the manner stated in the Option and neither party would have any claim against the other.
The Defendants also pleaded, in the alternative, that the Option granted to the Plaintiffs was not in the prescribed form as required by section 49A (2) of the Housing and Development Act (Cap 129) which rendered it null and void under section 49A(3) in that:
The Plaintiffs’ Reply was unnecessarily prolix and repetitious and contained recitals of evidence. It pleaded
In the event there was no waiver of Clause 5(b), they pleaded in the alternative that Clause 5(b) was subject to an implied term that the Defendants “must make themselves available and remain contactable to enable the Plaintiffs to deliver the signed option (original) to them as well as the said cheque.”
The Plaintiffs further relied on a pleading of estoppel on account of the Defendants’ conduct which precluded the Defendants from insisting on a strict compliance with the terms of the Option in particular Clause 5(b).
They also denied that the 1st Defendant had been sick and averred that she only made contact with the 1st Plaintiff on 22 June 2007, the day after the date for the exercise of the Option .
With the joinder of issues at the filing of the Reply, I could not understand why there was a necessity for the parties to file a Rejoinder and Surrejoinder in this case. These subsequent pleadings , in my view, added nothing to...
To continue reading
Request your trial