Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam v Krishnavanny d/o Vaithilingam (administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam, deceased) and another

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeVinodh Coomaraswamy J
Judgment Date04 February 2015
Neutral Citation[2015] SGHC 35
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberSuit No 817 of 2012
Year2015
Published date10 February 2015
Hearing Date28 June 2013,21 May 2013,22 May 2013,27 May 2014,23 May 2013,20 May 2013
Plaintiff CounselN Kanagavijayan (Kana & Co)
Defendant CounselMuralli Rajaram and Lim Min (Straits Law Practice LLC),A Thamilselvan (Subra TT Law LLC)
Subject MatterTrusts,Resulting trusts,Presumed resulting trusts,Constructive trusts,Equity,Estoppel,Proprietary estoppel Equity,Defences,Laches
Citation[2015] SGHC 35
Vinodh Coomaraswamy J: Introduction

Ponnusamy Sivapakiam died intestate on 14 February 2008.1 The single largest asset of her estate is the property known as 43 Swan Lake Avenue, Singapore 455725. She purchased the property in her sole name in 1966 at a price of $28,600. Her estate sold it 2012 at a price of $2.65m. This suit arises out of a claim by her eldest son, the plaintiff, that he has an interest in the property in equity over and above his interest in it arising from Sivapakiam’s intestacy.2

Sivapakiam had six children: three daughters and three sons. In order of their birth, her children are:3 Krishnavanny d/o Vaithilingam, a daughter and the first defendant; Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam, a son and the plaintiff; Olagaysbery d/o Vaithilingam a daughter; V Nithia, a daughter and the second defendant; Olagappan Vaithilingam Thirumall, a son; and V Davadass, a son.

The two defendants in these proceedings are the two administrators of Sivapakiam’s estate. Although they are sued jointly in their capacity as administrators, they have chosen to be represented separately in these proceedings. That is because they each oppose the plaintiff’s claim to a different extent and for a different reason.

Four of Sivapakiam’s six children gave oral evidence at trial. They are the plaintiff, the two defendants and Olagaysbery. It is fair to say that the plaintiff and the first defendant are broadly aligned in their evidence and approach, while the second defendant and Olagaysbery are broadly aligned in their evidence and approach. Thirumall and Davadass did not give evidence at trial. However, at my direction, they each filed an affidavit in the course of the trial stating their position. They aligned themselves with the second defendant’s case.

Purchase of the property

Sivapakiam’s husband, the late A O Vaithilingam, worked as an overseer in the Singapore City Council.4 He and his family resided in staff quarters along Veerasamy Road.5 On 18 October 1961, he passed away intestate.6 The principal asset of his estate was the money in his Municipal Provident Fund account amounting to $21,195.77.7 This money was subsequently paid out to and held in the estate account. Sivapakiam, as his widow, was entitled to 50% of this money, with her six children entitled to share the remaining 50% equally.8 But no separate distributions were made and this money was kept on deposit as a single fund.

Following Vaithilingam’s death, his family had to vacate the staff quarters which they occupied.9 Sivapakiam’s brother, Nadarajan s/o Punnosamy, took the family in. The family lived behind his residence at 3 Woo Mon Chew Road, Singapore 45505710 for the next few years. The plaintiff and the first defendant (on the one hand) and the second defendant and Olagaysbery (on the other hand) provide differing accounts of the conditions in which they lived there. The evidence of the plaintiff and the first defendant is that the family lived simply but comfortably in an “attap house” at the back of Nadarajan’s property at Woo Mon Chew Road.11 The evidence of the second defendant and Olagaysbery is that the family lived in squalid conditions12 in an “attap hut…amongst a goat shed, a chicken coop and three bucket system toilets”.13

This difference of recollection leads the plaintiff and the second defendant to differ on the reason Sivapakiam purchased the property. The plaintiff says that she purchased it as an investment.14 His evidence is that she consulted Nadarajan over what to do with Vaithilingam’s money.15 Nadarajan advised her to invest it in a landed property,16 and so she did.17 The second defendant denies this and avers that Sivapakiam bought the property not as an investment, but as a home for the family: in order to escape the squalid conditions in which they lived at Nadarajan’s property at Woo Mon Chew Road.18 I record these disputes of fact – concerning the living conditions at Woo Mon Chew Road and whether the property was bought as an investment or as a home – as background only. It is not necessary for me to resolve them in order to determine the plaintiff’s claim.

In 1966, the vendor of the property advertised it for sale in The Straits Times.19 Olagaysbery saw the advertisement and told Nadarajan and Sivapakiam’s brother-in-law, A Govindasamy about it. Govindasamy went to view the property and immediately paid $500 to the broker in order to secure the property. He then asked Sivapakiam and her mother to view the property. They viewed it and liked it. The plaintiff then viewed the property and he liked it too. Govindasamy negotiated a purchase price of $28,600. The plaintiff encouraged Sivapakiam to purchase the property at that price.20

On 19 October 1966,21 Sivapakiam purchased the property in her sole name.22 The total cost of acquiring the property (including all transaction costs) was $30,177.70.23 The acquisition was funded by a sum of at least $20,000 from the late Vaithilingam’s estate, with the balance sum provided by Govindasamy.24

Sale of the property

As mentioned, Sivapakiam died intestate on 14 February 2008.25 In September 2010, the first and second defendants were appointed the administrators of Sivapakiam’s estate.26 At that time, the plaintiff and Thirumall were living at the property.

It is fair to say that the two administrators are estranged.27 Differences emerged between them after their appointment as to how quickly the property ought to be sold. That led the second defendant to commence proceedings in February 201228 against the plaintiff and the first defendant (as her co-administrator) seeking an order that the property be sold within three months and that the plaintiff vacate the property to enable the conveyance to take place. In August 2012, the second defendant obtained an order that the property be sold within three months.29 The property was sold in October 2012 at a price of $2.65m with completion taking place in January 2013.30 The sale proceeds, net of all transaction costs, amounts to $2,609,417.66.31

The parties’ cases The plaintiff’s case

Under Rule 3 of s 7 of the Intestate Succession Act (Cap 146, 1985 Rev Ed), each of the six beneficiaries is entitled to an equal share in the property ie, a one-sixth share, or 16.667% each. The plaintiff, however, claims that he is entitled in equity to a one-third share in the property before any distribution to his siblings. 32 He therefore claims that one-third share in equity in addition to his one-sixth share in the remainder of the property under the intestacy.33 If the plaintiff’s claim is put in terms of percentages, he claims to be entitled to a 44.44% share (four-ninths) in the property comprising a 33.33% share (one-third) in equity plus an additional 11.11% share (one-sixth of the remaining two-thirds) under the intestacy.

He bases his claim for a one-third share in equity on three alternative grounds: first, that he is the beneficiary under a resulting trust; second, that he is the beneficiary under a constructive trust; and third, that a proprietary estoppel over one-third of the sale proceeds has arisen in his favour.34

Resulting trust

The plaintiff argues that a resulting trust arises in his favour because he made monetary contributions to the purchase of the property.35 His case is that he agreed with Govindasamy in 1966 that the money which Govindasamy paid towards the acquisition cost of the property (see [9] above) would be treated as an interest-free loan which the plaintiff, being the eldest son of the family, would be responsible for repaying to Govindasamy.36 Over the next 10 years, from 1966 to 1975, the plaintiff duly repaid the loan to Govindasamy in half-yearly instalments of $500 each.37 Govindasamy was content to treat his loan as satisfied upon payment of a rounded-down sum of $10,000.38

Common intention constructive trust

Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that he is the owner in equity of a one-third beneficial interest in the property by virtue of a common intention constructive trust.39 The plaintiff contends that Sivapakiam told him that she wished him to have a beneficial interest in the property after she learned that he was making repayments to Govindasamy.40 In particular, the plaintiff says that Sivapakiam told him that she wished him to have a beneficial interest amounting to “at least” one-third of the value of the property.41

Proprietary estoppel

Finally, the plaintiff relies on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. He contends that: Sivapakiam assured him that he had a beneficial interest in the property even though he was not its legal owner;42 he relied on this assurance by repaying the loan to Govindasamy;43 and the plaintiff suffered a detriment because he paid part of the purchase price of the property, but is now denied his beneficial interest.44

Although the plaintiff did not expressly plead reliance on proprietary estoppel, the second defendant, quite rightly, did not take objection in her closing submissions to his right to rely on it as an alternative basis for his claimed beneficial interest. The plaintiff relies on the very same facts to advance his claim on proprietary estoppel as he does in respect of his claim for a resulting trust and for a constructive trust. The only additional issues raised by the alternative claim in proprietary estoppel are pure issues of law. The second defendant addressed those issues of law in her closing submissions.

Relief sought

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s seeks the following relief: a declaration that he has a beneficial interest in the property; an order that he be given 33% of the net sale proceeds of the property; and an order that the balance of the net sale proceeds of the property be divided equally amongst the six children of Sivapakiam, including himself.

The first defendant’s case

The plaintiff’s and the first defendant’s case differ only as to the size...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT