Balasundaram v Public Prosecutor
| Jurisdiction | Singapore |
| Judge | Yong Pung How CJ |
| Judgment Date | 15 April 1996 |
| Neutral Citation | [1996] SGHC 78 |
| Docket Number | Magistrate's Appeal No 398 of 1995 |
| Date | 15 April 1996 |
| Year | 1996 |
| Published date | 19 September 2003 |
| Plaintiff Counsel | JB Jeyaretnam (JB Jeyaretnam & Co) |
| Citation | [1996] SGHC 78 |
| Defendant Counsel | Ong Chin Rhu (Deputy Public Prosecutor) |
| Court | High Court (Singapore) |
| Subject Matter | Whether there was miscarriage of justice,Right to counsel,Scope of right,ss 195 & 198(1) Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68),Constitution of the Republic of Singapore art 9(3),Constitutional Law,Whether trial judge erred in not granting adjournment to enable accused to be represented by counsel of his choice,Accused person,Rights |
The appellant was charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241) as follows:
You, Balasundaram s/o Suppiah M/26 yrs, NRIC No 6832377/J, are charged that you, on or about 8 February 1992, at about 9.50am, did knowingly give to Assistant Special Investigator Zainudin Mohd Amin of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, Singapore, information relating to the commission of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, to wit, that one Corporal Rajendran s/o Kannusamy of the Central Police Station had offered you a bribe of $500 to withdraw a police report lodged by you against the said Corporal Rajendran s/o Kannusamy and one Inspector Ronnie Cheam of the Ang Mo Kio Police Station, which was false and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under s 26A(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241).
At the end of the trial, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to three months` imprisonment. On appeal, the primary issue before me, as contended by counsel for the appellant, was whether the trial judge had erred in law in refusing to grant an adjournment which the appellant had sought to enable him to be represented by counsel of his choice, thus resulting in the appellant suffering a miscarriage of justice. After hearing the arguments before me, I was of the view that the appellant`s contention was without merit and accordingly dismissed the appeal. Before I deal with the reasons for the dismissal, I should give a brief account of the events that led to this appeal.
The appellant was charged in court on 22 July 1995. He was represented by one Mr Suresh Damodara. On 28 October 1995, the matter was fixed for trial which was to commence on 14 December 1995. The fixing was attended by one Ms Dube, and there was no record that she had objected to the trial dates. However, on 11 December 1995, Mr Damodara faxed a letter to the court registry and applied to vacate the hearing dates as he had to go for reservist training and had to prepare oral submissions for a High Court case which had to be completed in five days` time. The registrar replied the next day and informed Mr Damodara that his application to vacate the hearing dates had been rejected and that the hearing would proceed as scheduled. A second request was sent by Mr Damodara on the same day but this was once again turned down. On 13 December 1995, Mr Damodara appeared before the registrar to make a personal appeal but was told that his request could not be acceded to.
On the day of trial, Ms Dube appeared on behalf of Mr Damodara and applied for a week`s adjournment. The application was refused and the appellant discharged her. He then refused to take part in the proceedings, which were then stood down after the first witness was called to enable him to reconsider his position. Subsequently the appellant changed his mind and decided to engage Ms Dube to conduct his defence. However, Ms Dube was certified unwell for two days and sought the court`s indulgence for more time to prepare the case. Thus, proceedings were adjourned to 18 December 1995. On the morning of 18 December, the appellant once again discharged Ms Dube. It turned out that on 15 December he had engaged one Mr JB Jeyaretnam to represent him. Mr Jeyaretnam made an application to vacate the hearing dates once again, and to have the trial postponed for two to three weeks on the grounds that he was not prepared for the hearing and that the right to counsel of the appellant`s choice was a constitutional right. The appellant had been warned by Mr Jeyaretnam on 12 December that, if he could not get an adjournment, he would not be able to conduct the case for him. The trial judge refused the application and proceeded with the trial.
During the trial the appellant maintained his stand of not taking part in proceedings. At the end of the proceedings, the trial judge was satisfied that the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant was convicted and sentenced to three months` imprisonment.
In dealing with the question of law posed before me, it would be apt to refer first and foremost to art 9(3) of the Constitution of Singapore which provides:
Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.
Reference should also be made to s 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68) which provides:
Every person accused before any criminal court may of right be defended by an advocate.
Moreover, the court`s power to adjourn or postpone proceedings in criminal matters is governed by s 198(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code which states:
If in the absence of a witness or any other reasonable cause it becomes necessary or advisable to do so, a court may, by order, postpone the commencement of or adjourn any inquiry or trial on such terms as it thinks fit for such time as it considers reasonable and may, if the accused is not on bail, by a warrant remand the accused in such custody as the court thinks fit.
Although the appellant`s right to counsel is clearly spelt out in the Constitution as well as in the Criminal Procedure Code, this right is not an unqualified right. This had been established in the case of Palaniappa Chettiar v Arunasalam Chettiar FM CA 34/58 (unreported, quoted in Practice Direction (Adjournment) [1961] MLJ xxxiii) by Dato Sir James Thomson CJ who said:
It is wrong to say, as is frequently said, that a litigant is entitled to be represented by the counsel of his choice. The true statement is that he is entitled to be represented by the counsel of his choice if that counsel is willing and able to represent him.
This passage was quoted with approval by...
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Tan Chor Jin v Public Prosecutor
...and whether the right to counsel is available only if there are lawyers who are willing to represent the accused (eg, Balasundaram v PP [1996] 2 SLR 331 at 333–337, [6]–[18]). In other words, these cases involve the question of when the right to counsel becomes available. In contrast, the q......
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Tan Chor Jin v Public Prosecutor
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