Land Law
| Published date | 01 December 2004 |
| Citation | (2004) 5 SAL Ann Rev 389 |
| Author | TEO Keang Sood LLM (Malaya), LLM (Harvard); Advocate and Solicitor (Malaya); Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. |
| Date | 01 December 2004 |
17.1 During the year under review, several important cases pertaining to, inter alia, strata title law and conveyancing were decided. Issues concerning the jurisdiction of the strata titles boards, the interpretation of various statutory by-laws and the duties of a management corporation in relation to the common property were considered and clarified. In the area of conveyancing, the cases also clarified, among others, the scope of a vendor”s duty to consult a purchaser on the termination of tenancy pending completion of sale and the standing of an individual creditor to bring proceedings to void the fraudulent transfer of assets by a debtor who is subsequently made a bankrupt.
17.2 In Eu Yee Kai Alexander Junior v Hanson Ingrid Christina[2004] 4 SLR 586, the defendant, following her divorce from the plaintiff, lodged a caveat against the matrimonial home pursuant to s 115 of the Land Titles Act (Cap 157, 1994 Rev Ed) on the ground, inter alia, that the land and premises were a matrimonial asset. The plaintiff applied for, inter alia, the caveat to be removed. Counsel for the plaintiff had suggested that the defendant should have filed an application under s 132 of the Women”s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) for injunctive relief if she was apprehensive that the plaintiff would dispose of the property. The injunctive relief obtained would thus constitute a caveatable interest pursuant to s 115(3)(b) of the Land Titles Act. Counsel for the plaintiff relied on the decision in Lim Kaling v Hangchi Valerie[2003] 2 SLR 377 (discussed in (2003) 4 SAL Ann Rev 343 at paras 17.2—17.6) in support of his argument that the defendant had no legal basis to lodge the caveat. For the contrary position, counsel for the defendant cited the unreported decision in Chai Mei Leng v Cheng William (No 2)[1998] SGHC 381 which was considered in Lim Kaling v Hangchi Valerie.
17.3 Lai Siu Chiu J, in delivering the judgment of the High Court, had considered both the cases in detail and concluded that both decisions were peculiar to their own facts. In dismissing the application of the plaintiff, Lai J
held that the defendant had sufficiently discharged the onus of proof placed on her under s 127 of the Land Titles Act to show that the caveat had not been lodged frivolously or vexatiously or not in good faith. She distinguished the present proceedings from another action involving another property of the plaintiff wherein she had ordered the caveat lodged by the defendant to be removed. In the other action, the defendant had no basis to maintain the caveat as the property had been sold by the plaintiff and the defendant”s rights, if any, to the sale proceeds had to be balanced against the rights of the bona fide purchaser for value without notice. In any event, to safeguard the defendant”s interests, Lai J had ordered the plaintiff”s solicitors to hold the sale proceeds as stakeholders pending the decision of the family court on the ancillary issues. The position in the present action was different. As Lai J elaborated (at [27]):
Unlike the Other Property, the [present] Property was and is the matrimonial home of the parties and the children of the marriage. This was not only not disputed, but was admitted, by the plaintiff. Secondly, there was an interim order made by the family court judge that the Property should not be sold, pending her decision on the ancillary issues she had heard … Again, this fact was not disputed by the plaintiff. As he could not sell the Property until the outcome of the hearing on ancillary issues was known, there was neither a need nor any urgency to remove the Caveat. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff did intend to dispose of the Property, he was breaching the order of the family court. There was then all the more reason for the Caveat to remain, so that the defendant”s rights and interests were protected and she could be alerted early to the plaintiff”s intentions.
17.4 There was also no necessity for the defendant to apply for injunctive relief under the Women”s Charter since there was already an interim court order to protect her interest in the matrimonial home.
17.5 In Gurnam Kaur d/o Sardara Singh v Harbhajan Singh s/o Jagraj Singh[2004] 4 SLR 420, Tan Lee Meng J reiterated (at [6]) the principle that:
[W]here two or more joint tenants have contributed towards the purchase price of a property, there is a presumption in equity that each party”s interest in the property is in proportion to his or her financial contribution.
17.6 In the case before him, one of the joint tenants, namely, the defendant, had made no contribution to the purchase price of the property in question. The plaintiff became the sole owner of the property after her husband”s death. She allowed the defendant, her son, to become a joint tenant without requiring him to pay any money. Their relationship subsequently deteriorated to such an extent that the plaintiff brought the present application to sever the joint tenancy, and for the property to be sold and the net proceeds of sale divided between them. The defendant claimed to be entitled to 50% of the net proceeds of sale of the property.
17.7 After hearing arguments by counsel for both parties, Tan J ordered the joint tenancy severed and that the property be sold in the open market with the plaintiff having conduct of the sale. He also ruled that in the event the defendant refused to sign the documents facilitating the sale within two weeks after being asked to do so, the Registrar of the Supreme Court would sign the documents on his behalf.
17.8 On the issue of division of the net proceeds of sale, Tan J was of the view that the payments for food for the family, for electricity and water bills for the property and the money he gave the plaintiff for her expenses, if made, had nothing to do with the purchase price of the property. As for the defendant”s claim that he recently paid $13,000 for renovating the property, Tan J opined (at [7]) that:
[I]t is, without more, not appropriate to take such a payment into account when ascertaining the extent of a party”s interest in a property after the severance of a joint tenancy: see Sitiawah Bee bte Kader v Rosiyah bte Abdullah ([2000] 1 SLR 612). This is especially so where, as in the present case, the purchase price of the property was paid long before the renovation work was undertaken.
17.9 Nevertheless, considering the circumstances of the case, it was ordered that the plaintiff be paid 70% of the net proceeds of sale which was the amount claimed by her and that the defendant be paid the balance notwithstanding that he had made no contribution to the purchase price of the property.
17.10 In Top Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd v Lucky Red Investments Ltd[2004] 4 SLR 559, a dispute arose between the parties in respect of the tenancy agreement entered into between them. The High Court decided in favour of the respondent (see [2004] 2 SLR 199), allowing its claim for arrears in rent
and rejected the appellant”s claim for a refund of the hiring charges. Before the Court of Appeal, the appellant claimed for a refund of the hiring charges on the ground that they were paid pursuant to an illegal transaction. It was also argued that no arrears in rent were owed to the respondent. As the issues before the court did not strictly touch on land law principles, the case will be dealt with briefly.
17.11 On the claim pertaining to the hiring charges, Chao Hick Tin JA, who delivered the judgment of the court, found against the appellant. On the evidence, no attempt was made to hide the amount set aside as hiring charges as it was the intention of the parties to disclose the full terms of the tenancy agreement to the revenue authority. As the revenue authority was in no way deceived, the tenancy agreement was not an illegal contract. Even if it was, the appellant was still not entitled to a refund of the same as there was no mistake as to the amount which the appellant had agreed to pay for the use of the premises. There was no misunderstanding as to the sum on each occasion. Furthermore, the appellant knew that the amount to be set aside for the hiring charges had nothing to do with the market value of the items in the inventory and that the items in the inventory were incorrect. As such, the appellant was in pari delicto with the respondent and should not be allowed to claim a refund of the hiring charges.
17.12 As for the arrears in rent, there was evidence to show that there was an oral agreement or a tacit understanding between the parties to extend the reduced rent for the relevant period. The finding of the trial judge on this issue was, thus, wrong and could not be sustained. In the result, this part of the appellant”s appeal was, accordingly, allowed.
17.13 In Chong Ken Ban v MCST Plan No 1395[2004] 3 SLR 138 (‘Chong Ken Ban’), the respondent made an application to the Strata Titles Board under s 103 of the Land Titles (Strata) Act (Cap 158, 1999 Rev Ed) (‘LTSA’) to order the appellants to remove at their own costs the unauthorised structures on the balcony of their apartment and to reinstate the balcony to its original condition. The unauthorised structures were full height glass panels. Section 103(1)(c) of the LTSA expressly empowers the Board to make an order for the rectification of a complaint with respect to, inter alia, the failure to perform a duty imposed by the by-laws relating to the subdivided
building. The Board granted the orders sought, ruling that it had jurisdiction to do so.
17.14 In applying to the High Court for an order to set aside the orders of the Board, the appellants argued that the Board erred in law in holding that it had...
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