Pertamina International Marketing & Distribution Pte Ltd v P-H-O-E-N-I-X Petroleum Philippines, Inc (also known as Phoenix Petroleum Philippines, Inc) and another matter
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Sir Henry Bernard Eder IJ |
Judgment Date | 28 June 2024 |
Neutral Citation | [2024] SGHC(I) 19 |
Court | International Commercial Court (Singapore) |
Docket Number | Originating Application No 1 of 2024 and Originating Application No 23 of 2023 (Summons No 21 of 2024) |
Hearing Date | 25 June 2024 |
Citation | [2024] SGHC(I) 19 |
Year | 2024 |
Plaintiff Counsel | Daniel Chia Hsiung Wen, Ker Yanguang (Ke Yanguang), Charlene Wee Swee Ting and Chan Kit Munn Claudia (Prolegis LLC) |
Defendant Counsel | Koh Swee Yen SC (instructed) (WongPartnership LLP), Liew Yik Wee, Wong Wan Chee and Ng Tse Jun Russell (Rev Law LLC) |
Subject Matter | Arbitration,Agreement,Breach,Scope,Permanent anti-suit injunction |
Published date | 01 July 2024 |
These proceedings concern an arbitration brought under the auspices of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) in SIAC Case No. ARB No. 084 of 2022 (“ARB 84”) and a Final Award signed and dated 28 November 2023 (“Final Award”) whereby it was determined that the defendant, P-H-O-E-N-I-X Petroleum Philippines, Inc (also known as Phoenix Petroleum Philippines, Inc) (“Phoenix”), and another third party guarantor, Udenna Corporation (“Udenna”), were jointly and severally liable to the claimant, Pertamina International Marketing & Distribution Pte Ltd (“PIMD”), in the aggregate amounts of (a) US$142,932,694.04 (including interest and legal and other costs), and (b) S$218,948.60, plus interest from 29 November 2023 (save for interest on the legal and other costs, which would commence beginning 12 December 2023). Both Phoenix and Udenna are incorporated and based in the Philippines.
The background is set out in my previous judgment in
I would only add that since that previous judgment:
There are now before the Court two separate applications which overlap to a certain extent,
I heard these applications on 25 June 2024. At the end of the hearing, I informed Counsel of my decision
In summary, the broad gist of Phoenix’s submissions is as follows.
Before dealing with the substance of the applications, I should mention two matters.
First, PIMD has referred me to [32] of my previous Judgment where I expressed the view that “the actions taken by Phoenix in the Philippines Action […] clearly constitute a breach of ORC 5 and contempt of this court”. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that although no formal proceedings have been commenced for leave to issue committal proceedings under Order 25 of the Singapore International Commercial Court Rules 2021 (“SICC Rules”), my view remains unchanged, and that Phoenix has taken no steps to purge such contempt. Notwithstanding, as at the last hearing, I propose, in the exercise of my discretion, to hear Phoenix and to consider its submissions on the two sets of applications.
Second, I proceed on the basis that this is a
It is convenient to deal with this application first.
Jurisdictional framework under the Model LawAt the outset, it is important to understand the jurisdictional framework in which these applications come before the Court.
Section 3(1) of the IAA provides that “with the exception of Chapter VIII” the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as set out in First Schedule to the IAA (“Model Law”) has the force of law in Singapore.
Section 19B of the IAA provides in material part as follows: “An award made by the arbitral tribunal pursuant to an arbitration agreement is final and binding on the parties...” In essence, it is Phoenix’s case that the Final Award is not final and binding because it was not made “pursuant to an arbitration agreement” within the meaning of s 19B of the IAA.
Article 34 of the Model Law provides that recourse against an award may be made only by an application for setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of that Article. Article 34(3) provides that any such application must be made within three months of the date on which the party making the application has received the award.
Here, it is common ground that no such application has ever been made by Phoenix and that the time limit for so doing has expired. The result is that, as a matter of Singapore law, it is not open to Phoenix to seek recourse against the Final Award under Art 34.
However, Phoenix submitted, and I accept, that there is a separate question as to whether the Final Award may be enforced. That depends not on Art 34 but on s 19 of the IAA, which is the provision through which the Singapore Parliament had conferred on the courts the discretion to refuse enforcement of arbitral awards:
Enforcement of awards
In exercising the court’s discretion under s 19 of the IAA, the Court of Appeal has stated that it is open to the court to consider the same grounds for resisting enforcement under Art 36(1) of the Model Law:
In any event, it was common ground between the parties that I should proceed on the basis that in deciding whether or not I should grant or refuse enforcement of the Final Award, I should be guided by Art 36(1) of the Model Law which stipulates a number of grounds for refusing enforcement (and recognition). In relevant part, Art 36(1)(a)(iii)...
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